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Abstract 
Current databases are typically designed for particular predetermined purposes. 
However, users may need to use the same dataset for multiple and changing purposes, 
some of which may not be known when the database is designed. To handle multiple 
purposes in traditional data models, it is often necessary to construct multiple databases 
or views. When new information needs arise, additional databases or views may need to 
be constructed. 
The instance-based data model (IBDM) supports instances independent of any 
classes to which those instances might be assigned. The model adopts a two-layer 
approach to data organization (instance layer and class layer), so that an instance may 
belong to more than one class or, alternatively, none of classes defined in a database 
schema. The model makes it possible to construct multiple and flexible schemas for a 
dataset to support multiple and changing needs of users. However, previous research on 
the instance-based model does not address a number of issues related to the strengths of 
separating instance and class layers in the lBDM in fulfilling the needs of particular 
applications, including supporting database administration issues such as providing more 
flexible security policies. 
In thi s thesis, we propose theoretical and practical enhancements to the 
instance-based model. First, we extend the semantics and implementation methods of 
data expressed in the instance-based model. The semantic extension of components of the 
instance-based model clarifies the definition of the mode l and the implementation of the 
components simplifies applications to real database systems. Second, we provide a 
theoretical comparison and an empirical simulation to show that the instance-based 
model is more efficient than the relational model on some typical queries. Third, we 
propose a securit y model to address security issues in multilevel security applications 
using the instance-based approach. To ensure the model's security, we also provide 
operating methods and rules for the proposed model. Finally, we evaluate the proposed 
model and prove that the model is secure. By app lying the instance-based mode l to the 
multilevel security area, the research fonns the foundation for using the instance-based 
model to construct multiple schemas and to support multiple applications. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Building a database to support multiple applications is an essential aspect of 
database systems. However, traditional database models suffer from a serious drawback. 
Let us take an example. In the relational model, information has to be stored in tables in 
which each row represents an instance of an entity type (or class) [I]. Any presentation of 
the data in the database is based on the meaning of these tables (classes). So, in traditional 
models, for each application, one has to build a separate database. For example, we have 
bank management systems for bank applications, healthcare systems for hospital 
applications, sales management systems for retail applications, and so on. When the 
relational model was first proposed, the requirement for a separate database for each 
application was not a problem since there was no network connection between different 
systems. One specific system for one kind of application was reasonable. However, with 
the development of networks, systems now can be connected to many others. Meanwhile, 
some applications might need to combine several data sources from different databases 
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after these databases were built. For example, a customer in a retail system may also be a 
patient with an infectious disease (for example, the swine flu) in a hospital. It will be 
more efficient if physicians at the hospital can combine the data in the two systems to find 
out the whereabouts of other customers who had contacted with the patient. Not only 
would it be inefficient to bui ld a system to combine data for the application but also 
traditional models have lots of inherited problems when combining data. For example, 
how to combine the customer's categorical age (e.g. child, adult, and senior) with the 
patient's age (in the form of an exact numerical age)? It will be more efficient if the two 
systems can be combined together without any additional steps. However, in traditional 
models, a system can be built only if we know the applications for which the system will 
be used. It is difficult also to use a system to support a non·defined application after the 
system is built. For example, in the traditional models, we cannot query information of a 
patient from a retail system. That is, traditional models can support an anticipated 
application of a database, but they cannot support any non·anticipated appl ication of a 
database after the database was built. 
To overcome the problems of traditional models, Parsons and Wand proposed a 
new model, the instance-based data model ( IBDM) [2], by applying ontological theory [3] 
[4] to data modeling. The model adopts a two-layer approach so that an instance may 
belong to more than one class. By using a two·layered approach, the model makes it 
possible to construct multiple and flexible schemas for a dataset to support multiple or 
changing purposes. However, previous research only focused on the abstract model. How 
the semantics of components should be and how they should be implemented not been 
considered. In the absence of these considerations, it is difficult to apply the model to any 
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real application. In this thesis, we address several issues of the instance·based data model 
and their implementation methods according to Bunge's ontology. The research provides 
clear understanding of the components of the instance-based data model so that they can 
be implemented easily. We also propose a new security model, the instance·based 
multilevel security model [5], based on the instance based model, to solve problems in the 
current multilevel security data models. The research also demonstrates that the instance-
based data model can be applied to some special areas to make databases more suitable 
for applications in these areas. 
l.l Background 
I. 1.1 Databases 
By definition, a database is a structured collection of related data (I]. Despite this 
general definition, currently databases usually have many restrictions. For example, a 
database is designed for a special purpose. It can be used only for the applications it is 
intended to be used for. For example, when we use a bank machine (essentially a 
computer or computer-based machine) to deposit/withdraw money, we arc dealing with a 
bank database system. Or if we check our util ity bill online, we are dealing with a 
supplier's database system. We cannot deposit/withdraw money to/ from our bank account 
by using a supplier's database. 
As a component of computer sofnvare, database technologies are important in all 
areas where computers are used [6]. With the increase of related computer usage, the use 
of database technology has increased in recent decades as well. 
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1.1.2 Data Models 
A data model is a collection of concepts that can be used to describe the structure 
of a database [7]. Most commonly, the structure of a database includes types of data, 
relationships between data and constraints that hold on data. 
Based on the constructs data models provide to users, we categorize data models 
in two types: conceptual data models and physical data models [8]. Conceptual data 
models provide higher level constructs that are closely related to how users perceive data. 
For example, conceptual data models express what kinds of entities arc stored in a 
database and what kind of relationships exist behveen entities. Conceptual models, such 
as the entity-relational model [9], are widely used by either database designers or end 
users. On the other hand, physical data models provide lower level concepts that describe 
data stored in computers. They describe how the infonnation represented in the 
conceptual model is actually implemented, how the infonnation exchange requirements 
are implemented, and how the data entities and their relationships are maintained. The 
physical data model usually is used to calculate storage estimates and may include 
specific storage allocation details for a given database system. Since the physical data 
models are so closely related to computer technology, in most cases, they are only used 
by computer specialists. In this thesis, we largely deal with conceptual data models. Only 
Chapter 4 refers to physical data models. 
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1.1.3 Ontologies 
Ontology is the study of being or existence and its basic categories and 
relationships [3]. Ontology attempts to describe what things exist, and how these things 
can be related together or can be grouped according to similarities and differences. There 
are several ontological theories used in the computer science and information systems 
field. Different ontologies may be used for different objectives. For example, domain 
specific ontology [I 0] and upper ontology [II] arc mostly used in the area of information 
science. In this research we usc a general ontology, Bunge's ontology [3] [4], because it 
has been used to analyze infonnation systems model ing concepts and has produced useful 
results [2] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [1 9]. 
1.2 Problems with Current Data Models 
Current databases are designed for particular purposes. However, users may need 
to use the same dataset for multiple purposes. For example, in a university, the head of a 
department may be interested in the academic information of a student; library staff may 
need to know the information about the books people borrowed; and an officer in the 
campus security department may need information about the names of the faculty 
members who are authorized to enter lecture halls during a period of time. To handle 
these purposes in traditional database models, it is often necessary to construct multiple 
databases. As the need for infonnation increases, more databases need to be constructed. 
Enabling a database to support multiple applications is an essential issue for the 
effective use of database technologies. For example, the relational model [23] provides 
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"views" to support multiple purposes. However, views in the relational model and other 
traditional models are only subsets of the schemas of the database schema. That is, a view 
can only provide infonnation that is included in the schema of a database. It cannot 
provide infom1ation that is beyond the schema. 
The idea of a global schema has been proposed to accommodate multiple 
applications [20]. However, at least two problems have since emerged: First, it is nearly 
impossible to identify all the potential queries that a user could make beforehand. For a 
global purpose, before building the actual database, designers will probably have very 
limited knowledge of who will query the database and what their interests will be. 
Second, even if all the potential queries were considered in advance, a new problem 
arises: designing a global schema that is able to support all these queries. For example, to 
design a large database system (even a large database system may not be a global 
system), a group of designers may need to work for many months [I]. As a result, 'the 
universal data model may be unaflainabie.' [20] 
The fundamental problem with existing data models is that they arc schema-based 
[2]. ln these models, data stored in a database is organized based on the schema of the 
database. However, the schema of a database is designed only for a particular application 
and it is fixed. It can merely represent data related to the application under the schema 
and answer only questions pertaining to this application. 
E~ttcnding the instance-based data model: Semantics, performance and ~urity considemtions 
1.3 Our Contributions 
To overcome the problems of the traditional models, the instance-based data 
model (lBDM) was proposed [2]. The instance-based data model supports instances 
independent of classes. The model adopts a two-layer approach so that an instance may 
belong to more than one class or, alternatively, it may not belong to any classes at all in a 
database. By using a two-layered approach, the model makes it possible to construct 
multiple and flex ible schemas for a dataset to support multiple, even unanticipated or 
changing purposes. Figure I illustrates multiple schcmas (each related to an application) 
built on top of one set o f data. As shown in Figure I, each schema in the Class-level may 
only deal with part of data in the Instance-level. However, no global schema is needed in 
the model. So, with the model, it is easier to build a database for multiple applications. 
Schema 1 Schema 2 Schema 3 Class-level 
Instance-level 
Figure I: An Example of Multiple Schemas in the Instance-based Data Model 
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Previous research on the instance-based data model does not address a number of 
issues related to the strengths o f separating instance and class layers in the IBDM in 
fulfi lling the needs of particular applications, including supporting database 
administration issues such as providing more flexible security policies. In this thesis, we 
extend the semantics of the instance-based components and implementation methods for 
data expressed in the instance-based data model. We address several issues of the 
instance-based data model and their implementation methods according to Bunge's 
ontology. The main contributions of the thesis are follows: 
I. Extending semantics of Bunge's ontology to the instance-based data model 
a. We clearly define the semantics of the instance identifier and propose a 
possible method to implement instance identifiers in the instance-based 
data model . 
b. We address how to express properties and their relationship in the 
instance-based data model in order to reduce the complex ity of 
managing an instance-based database and increase the query capability 
of the model. 
c. We build a model to demonstrate how to represent the real world in 
different levels in the instance-based data model according to Bunge's 
ontology: instances related to each other fonn a higher level conceptual 
thing so that all instances combine together fanning the real world in 
the highest level. 
d. We define several integrity rules of the instance-based data model to 
reduce possible inconsistencies in the model. 
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2. We demonstrate that, in theory and in practice, the instance-based data model 
is not only flexible for queries, but also faster than the relational model in 
processing a broad range of queries. 
3. We propose a new security data model, the instance-based multilevel security 
model (lBMSM), based on the instance-based data model as an application of 
the theory. The new model solves several problems in the multilevel security 
control area. ln the thesis: 
a. We formally define the instance-based multilevel security model to 
solve data polyinstantiation and data inference problems in class-based 
multilevel security model. This includes: 
i. Definition of data interpretation and integrity rules. 
ii. Definition of a two-layered control model for the instance-
based multi level security control. 
b. We extend operations of the traditional SQL statements and instance-
based iQ L[70J statements to the multilevel security model. 
c. We prove that the instance-based multilevel security model is a secure 
model. 
I .4 Thesis Organization 
In the next chapter, we first review the most commonly used data models. We 
point out the problems with the current data models in more detail. Next, we review the 
instance-based data model. The introduction of the instance-based data model includes: 
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the ontological principles used to build the instance-based data model, the basic concepts 
of the instance-based data model, and the possible structures and implementation methods 
in the instance-based databases. We also briefly discuss advantages of the instance-based 
data model. 
In Chapter 3, we introduce the basic elements of Bunge's ontology: what is a 
thing, what are properties and attributes, what kinds of relationships exist between 
instances, what is a class and a kind, and the concept of systems. 
In Chapter 4, we discuss some semantic extensions of the instance-based data 
model: what are the semantics of the instance identifier and how to implement them, what 
are properties and rela1ionships between them, and how to represent the real world in the 
instance-based data model. In the final part of Chapter 4, we introduce integrity rules for 
the instance-based data model. 
In Chapter 5, we compare querying in the instance-based data model with 
querying in the relational model. The comparison has two parts, the first part is a 
theoretical comparison and the second is an empirical evaluation on a test database. 
Chapter 6 introduces the concepts of multi level security control and the problems 
with current models. In Chapter 7 we propose the instance-based multilevel security 
model (IBMSM) and provide data interpretation, integrity rules, and operation methods of 
the model in this chapter. In this chapter, we also prove that the IBMSM is a secure data 
model and show that it addresses several unsolved problems under the traditional 
multilevel security models. 
10 
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Chapter 8 compares the lBMSM model with other class-based multilevel 
relational models and indicates how the new model solves the problems of the current 
models. 
Chapter 9 provides some conclusions and summaries the primary contribution of 
this research. It also suggests several research areas for future investigation. 
II 
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Chapter 2 
Data Models 
A database is an organized collection of data. A data model is a collection of 
logical constructs used to represent the data structure and the data re lationships within the 
database. [6] 
2.1 Review ofData Models 
Many data mode ls have been proposed. Most of them are class-based models. For 
better understandings of the concepts of the instance-based data model, we will review 
some of the most popular models in the following sections. 
2.1.1 Flat File Model 
This is not considered as a data model by some scholars, si nce it merely shows 
tab les of values . The relationships between records and between tables cannot be 
12 
Extending the instance-based data model: Semantics, performance and security considerations 
represented in such a model. Data are simply stored in the database. This model was 
mainly used in the early age of computer database, but it has no obvious advantage, 
compared to modem database systems. For example, users may have to search the entire 
database to find required results in the flat file model. Therefore, querying a large 
database is very slow. 
2.1.2 Hierarchical Model 
In the hierarchical data model (21 ], data are organized into a tree structure. The 
structure allows repeating different types of information using the parent/child (or 
hierarchical) relationships. However, the relationship between parent and child can only 
have one·tO·many relationships. Figure 2 shows an example of the hierarchical model. 
Figure 2: An Example of the Hierarchical Data Model 
The hierarchical model is the first model which represents relationships between 
different data tables. Compared to the flat file model, hierarchically structured database 
13 
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systems are very fast for certain types of queries. Hierarchical structures were widely 
used in the first generation of mainframe database management systems. 
Because of its one-to-many relationship, the hierarchical structure is simple to 
construct; however, the limitation of this model is also a consequence of its simplicity. 
Relationships in the real world are not just parent/child relationships, as many-to-many 
relationships are also very common. But it is costly to represent many-to-many 
relationships in the hierarchical data model. Thus, the hierarchical data model is often not 
able to adequately represent many structures that exist in the real world. 
2.1. 3 Network Model 
System 
ESSN Pnumber Hours 
f.k f.k 
P_workson 
De endent 
Em SSN Name Sex Bdate Relationsh 
f.k 
Figure 3: An Example of the Network Model (I ] 
The Network model was introduced in the same period as the hierarchical model 
by Codasyl data base task group [22]. Its structure is very similar to the hierarchical 
model. The only difference is that, instead of a tree of records such that each record has 
14 
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one parent but many ch il dren records, the network model a llows records to have multipl e 
parent and child records, forming a net\vork structure. An example of the network model 
is illustrated in Figure 3. The advantage of the network model, in comparison to the 
hi erarchical model, is that it allows a more natural way of modeling re lationships 
benveen enti ti es. 
2.1.4 Relational Model 
With the growth of data intensive applications and of computational capacity, a more 
flexible database model, the re lational mode l [23], emerged to replace the hierarchical 
and network models. The fundamental assumptio n of the relational model is that a ll data 
can be represented as mathemat ical re lations. The relat ional data model permits designers 
to create a consistent logica l model of information and refine it through database 
nonnalization. An example of the relational model is shown in Figure 4. 
Customer 
I Customer 10 I Name I Address I mv I State I Phone I 
Order 
I Order No I Customer ID I In voice No I Date Placed I Date Promised I Status I 
Invoice 
I Invo ice No I Customer 10 I Order No I Date I Status 
Product 
I Product Code I Product Description 
Figure 4: An Example of the Relati onal Model 
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The foundation for the relational model is set theory. Set operations, such as union, 
intersection and Cartesian product, fonn the basis for querying data. The use of sets and 
set operations provides independence from physical data structures (in contrast to the 
hierarchical model and the network model), a pioneering concept at the time it was 
introduced. 
The relational model is a successful commercial model; even today, most database 
systems still use this model. Its ultimate success also comes from continuing research 
efforts after the model was proposed [24]. 
2.1.5 Entity-Relationship (ER) Model 
The entity-relationship (ER) model was proposed by Chen in 1976 [9J. The ER 
model is a conceptual data model (or semantic data model) that views the real world in 
tem1s of entities and relationships. A basic component of the model is the entity-
relationship diagram, which visually represents data objects. The basic model has been 
extended [25} [26], and today it is frequently used to design databases. 
Figure 5: An Example of the ER Model 
16 
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There are two primary advantages of the ER model. First, it maps well to the 
relational model. The constructs used in the ER model can be easily transfonned into 
relational tables. Given this advantage, the model is mostly used as a design plan by the 
database developer to implemem a data model using specific database management 
software. Second, it is easy to understand with minimum amount of training. Therefore, 
the model can be used by the database designer to communicate the design with end 
users. 
2.1.6 Object-Oriented Model 
The Object-oriented data model (27] integrates databases with obj ect-oriented 
technologies. Several object-oriented models were proposed in the early 1990s [28]. 
However, these models suffered from two drawbacks, lack of standardization and lack of 
successful implementation approaches to ensure interoperability between products [29]. 
Even today, there are only a few applications using object-oriented data models, and they 
are usually specialized applications such as engineering databases or molecular biology 
databases rather than mainstream commercial data processing. However, object database 
ideas were picked up by the relational vendors and influenced extensions made to these 
products and indeed to the Structured Query Language (SQL). For example, both Oracle 
[30] and Microsoft [3 1] add extensions in their database platform to support some object-
oriented features. 
Based on the popular data models, Hammer and McLeod define database and 
database model as follows: 
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A database is more than just a collection of values. At eve1y point in time, the 
contents of a database represent a snapshot of the state of an application system, and the 
changes to the database over time reflect the sequence of events occurring in the 
application environment. In olher words, a database is a model of a real world system 
[32]. 
2.2 Problems with Current Models 
All the above models are based on a common assumption that data instances (e.g. 
records, tuples, entities, objects) should always be classified into certain types (record 
types, relations, emity types, classes) and relationships exist between the types. 
Therefore, they represent each entry by a sequence of values and then assign the entry its 
type. The meaning of the entry is provided by the type to which it belongs. For example, 
the entry {Ford, 50, 80} that belongs to the type {name, age, weight}, which means a 
person name is Ford, his age is 50 and his weight is 80kg, wi ll be completely different if 
it belongs to the type {Maker, Year, engine}, which means a car is made by Ford in 1950 
and it has 80 horse power engine. We call this kind o f model a 'class~based dma model'. 
In a class~based data model, each type (record types, relation, entity types) can be 
expressed as a class. Class~based data models have been very successful for the past 50 
years, but there are a number of problems with them. 
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2.2.1 Merging Problem 
The merging problem is a problem of semantic integration in class-based data 
models. In the models, since each database is designed for special purposes, the schema 
of each database is different. Each database is a closed world under its schema [ I] [33]. 
When it is necessary to query multiple databases for a new application, the databases first 
have to be merged. However, how to merge these databases is a cmcial issue. Since 
models are based on classes, one has to merge the classes (schemas) first before merging 
the data itself. 
There are lots of difficulties in merging schemas and data [34] [35] [36] [37] [38]. 
Figure 6 shows some of the basic problems when merging schemas of multiple databases 
in class-based data models. The schemas of two relational databases 1-1 and L on house-
listing and the semantic correspondences between them are shown in Figure 6. Database 
Figure 6: Merging Problems [34] 
\9 
Extending the instance-based data model: Semantics, performance and security considerations 
H consists of two tables: HOUSES and AGENTS; database L consists of the single table 
LISTINGS. Figure 6 also shows the duplicate record problem of merging data of multiple 
databases. The first record in schema H is the same as the second record in schema L. 
The list price is arrived by combining price and fee-rate. 
Many challenges have been encountered in perfonning semantic integration [34] 
and researchers have proposed several approaches to do the matching, such as rule-based 
solutions [39] [40] [4 1] and learning-based solutions [42] [43] [44] [45]. Even with these 
methods, problems may not be eliminated. The basic idea of a rule-based solution is to 
design some rules for mapping one schema to another schema or a global schema. The 
rule-based methods do not require training so they are faster when trying to build a 
matching system; however, they cannot exploit data instances effectively since they need 
to calculate the matching (rules) at query time. Also, they cannot exploit previous 
matching efforts to assist in the current ones. The learning-based method is efficient after 
the calibration; however, the calibration process itself is much more complicated. Also, 
since it operates on records, it is quite slow when working on a large dataset. For 
example, most learning-based algorithms may take more than an hour to generate a 
higher level model on large datasets. 
2.2.2 Multiple Application Problem 
A database should support multiple classifications so that the user can choose a 
preferred classification as the basis of a query. A database should also be able to translate 
between different classifications. However, current database systems are not suited to this 
20 
Extending the Instance-based data model: Semantics, performance and security considerations 
task [46] [47]. A database is designed for a specialized purpose in class-based data 
models; however, users may have several interests at the same time. For example, in a 
university, the head of a department may need academic infom1ation; library staff may 
need information about the books people borrowed; and an officer in the campus security 
department may need informat ion about the list of faculty who are authorized to enter 
lecture halls during a period of time. To handle these purposes in traditional database 
models, it is often necessary to construct multiple databases. As the need for infonnation 
increases, more databases (or views) need to be constructed. Bui lding views may reduce 
some complexity to query databases, but views depend on base tables of databases. After 
base tables in a database are created, views of the database cannot provide any more 
infom1ation other than querying the base tables. It will be much more efficient if a master 
database system can be constructed to handle all the needs; however, predicting such 
Figure 7: Constructing a Higher Level Schema for Multiple Databases 
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needs is challenging. Some researchers have tried to solve this kind of problem. The idea 
is to construct a single higher level schema to cover all the applications. Figure 7 
demonstrates the basics behind this idea. However, such an approach will give rise to the 
merging problem from the previous discussion. The problem also will grow if no shared 
common schema of the multiple applications can be found. 
2.2.3 Design Problem 
In class·based data models, designers have to create a schema of a database in 
advance and it will be rarely changed after the database is built. This places a heavy 
burden on the designers and the process is time consuming. Designers have to discuss 
with the users and make sure they have understood what the users' demands may be for 
querying the database and what should be in the database. Therefore, it is difficult and 
time·consuming to build a schema for a large database [I]. Scholars have tried to 
simplify this step by building some standard schemas for similar applications and calling 
these schemas the universal data model [48]. The idea of the universal data model is to 
build standard schemas for people to reuse them. It may reduce some duplicated effects: 
"Universal data models can substantially reduce the time to complete a corporate data 
model, logical data model or data warehouse design. " [ 48] However, at least two 
problems with the universal data model emerge: First, nearly infinite numbers of 
potential applications exist for which people may need to query data. Using only a few 
schemas to cover all these applications is impossible. Second, another problem is that 
there is no method to evaluate whether the designed schema will be satisfactory or not 
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before the database is buill and used. So there is always the risk that such a database will 
not satisfy all the users' demands. 
2.2.4 User Problem 
In the traditional (relational) model, data are stored in tables (classes) and users 
have to follow the structure of the tables and their relationships (schema) to operate on 
the database. However, especially in large, complex databases, users may not have much 
knowledge about the database and/or may not be familiar with the schema of the 
database. Graphic interfaces could be helpful, but such interfaces also limit users' access 
based on the purposes of the interface [49]. 
2.2.5 Summary 
The common problem of class-based data models is that they are specialized and 
application-based, in which the data stored in databases are based on its application. 
When a dmabase is built, database designers only design a schema that structures the data 
to support the infonnation needs for a proposed applicmion. Since different information 
is required for each different application, there will be problems when users try to 
combine information coming from several different applications. Merging problems as 
we have described above could occur. 
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2.2.6 Current Solutions 
There are t\vo alternate solutions to the problem: one is that when one bui lds a 
database, one designs a data model that will be suited for multiple applications. However, 
although designers may have some idea about the proposed appl ications, they cannot 
predict if and what kind of new applications could be applied in the future. So, unless 
designers can build a universal data model which covers all the potential applications, 
this solution is not pem1anent to solve the multiple-application problem. However, there 
is no universal data model for class-based data models. Therefore, in a class-based data 
model, it is impossible to design such a database that covers a lithe potential needs of the 
users. 
The second method is to build a new database whenever a different appl ication is 
desired. Repeatedly constructing database systems will cause several problems, both 
technical and non-technical. For example, it wi ll cause problems in maintenance of each 
of the databases in the future (technical), and it will waste time and money to build 
multiple databases (economical). 
Since class-based data models have the problems above, researchers have 
proposed other models to overcome the problems by using instances as a basic unit of a 
database system. However, most proposed models are not efficient in class-related 
queries. For example, the functional data model [50] [5 1], the logical data model [52], the 
item-centric data model [53] and the attribute based data model [54] are inefficient when 
queries refer to classes since they do not store any infonnation about classes. 
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2.3 The Instance-Based Bata Model (IBDM) 
The instance-based data model is based on the ontology of Bunge [31 [4] and 
research on classification theory [2]. It does not rely on the concept of inherent 
classification, which is fundamental to class-based models such as the relational and 
object oriented models. This section wi ll review some of the important concepts of the 
instance-based data model, based on Parsons and Wand [2]. 
2.3.1 Ontological Principles Used in the Instance-Based Data 
Model 
The instance-based data model is based on research in the field of cognitive 
classification. It also depends on several ontology principles: 
Principle 2.1: The world is made of things that possess properties. 
An ontological principle connects the ex istence of a thing with its properties. 
Principle 2.2: No two things can possess an identical set of properties. 
Principle 2.3: Classes are abstractions created by humans in order to describe simi larities 
among things. 
Two conclusions can be derived from above principles [2]: 
Implication 2.1: Recognizing the ex istence of things should precede classifying them. 
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Implication 2.2; There is no single "correct" set of classes to model a given domain of 
instances and properties. The particular choice of classes depends on the application. 
The instance-based data model also assumes an "open world"; 
Postulate 2. 1; Whether a property of a thing exists is not detem1ined by human's 
recognition but by the thing itself. 
When people refer to a property of things, there are two meanings: one is that it is 
possessed by things; the other is people realize and define a property (or a set of 
properties) of things. In Bunge's ontology [3] [4], we call th is property an attribute. We 
will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 3. 
2.3.2 Basic Concepts of the Instance-Based Data Model 
The basic idea of the instance-based data model is to separate instances from 
classes. To achieve this goal, the instance-based data model suggests a two-layered 
approach using layers to store infonnation separately; the Instance Layer, which stores all 
the information about instances, and the Class Layer, which only stores information about 
classes (structured as in Figure 8). 
The instance layer consists of instances and their properties. Properties may be 
intrinsic (belonging to an instance) or mutual (shared by more than one instances, and 
often represented by relationships or associations in traditional data modeling terms). An 
instance in the Instance Layer can be represented as an instance-id followed by a set of 
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Instance 1 Instance 2 Instance 3 
Pro~erty1 Pro~ertv2 Pro~ertv 1 
Property n Propertym Property q 
Instance Layer 
Class 1 Class P 
Class Layer 
Figure 8: Two Layers in the lnstance·Based Data Model 
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instance! 
property l-ID 
property 2-ID 
property 3-ID 
mutual ropcrtv l-ID 
instance) 
property l-ID 
property 2-10 
mutua\propeny\-10 
Figure 9: Data Storage Methods for the Instance Layer 
pairs of properties and values, i.e., lnstance-id {(property!, value I), (property2, value2), 
... } . Figure 9 shows the structure of data in the Instance Layer. In Figure 9, there are two 
possible structures in the Instance Layer: one is only to use the shaded part to store the 
infonnation; the other is to use both parts (shaded and unshaded) to do so. A framework 
for implementation and comparison of the two structures is discussed in [49]. From the 
implementation and comparison we know that the second data structure (using the shaded 
part) is suitable for small database systems, but the first data structure (both shaded and 
unshaded parts) is suitable for general purposes. Query operations on the Instance Layer 
consist of: ( I) instances that exist and (2) properties of an instance (and their values). 
Update operations on the Instance Layer include: ( I) addition and deletion of instances, 
(2) addition and deletion of properties of instances, and (3) update of values of properties. 
The Class Layer consists of a collection of classes. A class is a set of instances 
that share common properties [3]. In the instance-based data model, a class is defined as a 
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set of properties. Any instance that possesses these properties belongs to this class. The 
possible structures of the Class Layer are shown in Figure I 0. Two possible structures 
exist. One is to use the shaded part only to store the information; the other is to use both 
shaded and unshaded parts for storage. A detailed comparison of the two structures is 
Class I 
Propcrty\ _10 
Property2_1D 
Mutualpropcrtyl_ID 
Instanccl_ID 
lnstancc2_1D 
Class2 
Propcrtyl_ ID 
PropertyJ_ID 
Mutualpropertyi_ ID 
lnstance i_ ID 
lnstanceJ_ID 
Figure I 0: Data Storage Methods for the Class Layer 
discussed in [49]. From that comparison we know that the first one (using the shaded 
part) is suitable for databases which have more update operations, but the second one 
(using both shaded and unshaded parts) is suitable for query intensive applications. 
Suggested query operations at the class level consist of: (I) classes that exist, (2) 
properties that make up a class, and (3) instances that belong to a class (this query 
associates the Class Layer with the Instance Layer). Update operations at the class level 
include insertion and deletion of classes (modification of class definitions can be done by 
a sequence of deletions and insenions). 
The two-layered approach gives the instance-based data model two distinctive 
characteristics. First, instances can be added and stored to a database directly, not as an 
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instance of some classes, even if they do not belong to a class, or altematively, they can 
belong to many classes simultaneously. Second, changes can be made at the class level 
without operations on the instance level. 
2.4 Advantages of the !BDM 
The instancc·based data model uses two layers to store classes and instances 
separately. Since it supports the existence of instances in a database without classes and 
class definitions only depend on the concepts (properties) in the database, the major 
advantages in this model are: 
(I) Designation of a schema prior to populating a database is unnecessary in the instance· 
based data model. In the model, the schema can be defined according to the applications 
so that it enhances system efficiency in query operations. In this model, a fixed schema is 
unnecessary. 
(2) In traditional database models, relationships are often described as links between 
classes (e.g., foreign keys in the relational model). Relationships are only between classes 
(and are part of the schema in the traditional database). Therefore, it is important to 
analyze carefully the relationships between classes during database design in traditional 
models. Therefore, it is arduous and laborious for the program designers to create all 
relationships beforehand. However, the instance·based data model supports relationships 
between individual instances. If an additional relationship is found or created between the 
instances, simply adding a mutual property shared by these instances will store this 
relationship and solve the problem. 
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(3) A database built using the IBDM can store properties about instances, regardless of 
whether there is a class to hold the data, in contrast to the traditional model in which the 
schema (e.g. , relations) determines what properties can be kept about instances (via the 
attributes they possessed by virtue of their membership in classes). 
(4) In the traditional database models, onl y one schema ex ists for one dataset (that is the 
schema of the database). Some views can be defined for query convenience. However, 
the views only support structure within the schema of a database; that is, a view on ly 
supports one spec ific purpose within the more general database purpose. As shown in 
Figure II (a), in the traditional database models, the schema o f database abstracts the 
meaning of the database. A view can be and in most systems is a partial database schema. 
It cannot contain informat ion that is not in the database schema. In contrast, in the 
instance·based data model a data set has dynamic schema, as shown in Figure II (b), 
D:o.t:o.b :u .. Scheon :o. 
Tr:o..ndition:o.ld:o.ta •nodd n ... h qtan ce. b,....,d d>tt:O. rnodd 
(a) (b) 
Figure II : Differences between Views and Schemas 
31 
Extending the instance-based data model: Semantics, performance and security considerations 
supporting different schema to meet different application needs. These schemas (views) 
are completely distinct from the views in the traditional models. ln this model, there is no 
need to design a global master schema to include other schemas (views). 
2.5 Summary 
The instance-based data model provides a new approach to the field of databases. 
The model is guided by ontological principles recognizing that the world and instances 
are extendable and independent of classes. Those distinctive aspects of the instance-based 
data model make it an open-world system, compared to the traditional model that 
imposes a closed-world system. Several advantages show that the model is more 
appropriate for multiple applications in one single data set. In fact, some of the 
applications might not have been anticipated when the database was constructed. 
In this chapter we reviewed several class-based data models. We described the 
common aspects of each model and pointed out the basic problem of the class-based 
model. We then introduced the instance-based data modeL We introduced the principles 
of the instance-based data model and its possible data structures. Finally, we compared 
the instance-based data model with the class-based model and indicated the advantages of 
the instance-based data model. Since the instance-based data model is developed based 
on Bunge's ontology, to take advantage of this model, in the next chapter, we wi ll discuss 
some related ontological issues to address these needs in the instance-based data model. 
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Chapter 3 
Ontology Principles 
The instance-based data model can resolve numerous problems that occur in 
class-based data models due to the restriction that instances must belong to classes. 
However, the model also faces technical challenges that are not addressed in the original 
180M proposal [2}. Prior to studying appl ications of the instance-based data model, some 
concepts and their operations under the model need to be described in detail. We do this 
in this chapter. In the next chapter, we extend the semantics of the instance-based 
components and implementation methods for data expressed in the instance-based data 
model . 
3. 1 Basic Ontological Principles 
"Ontology is the study of being or existence and forms the basic subject mafler of 
metaphysics, describing the basic categories and relationships of being or existence to 
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define entities and types of emities within its framework" [3]. The ultimate objective of 
ontology is to study the most general features of reality. In the field of information 
analysis, ontology is used by philosophers and scientists working in artificial intelligence, 
database theory, and natural language processing. In recent years, ontology has been 
introduced to a variety of applications ranging from system design and analysis, to Web 
services, to biomedical infom1atics, to the semantic Web. Ontology in these fields can be 
categorized into such tools as conceptual analysis or as approaches to solve technical 
problems [55] [!OJ. Our research focuses on the conceptual analysis category. 
Wand and Weber first introduced Bunge's ontology [3] to the information system 
field [14] [15] [1 6] [ 17] [18] [19]. They define a mapping from the ontological concepts 
into modeling language constructs. They use ontology to analyze the meaning of 
common conceptual modeling constructs and provide a precise definition of several 
conceptual modeling constructs. Their research makes building a conceptual model closer 
to reality. Parsons and Wand developed several information models [2] [57] based on 
Bunge's ontology to solve problems in current models. 
3.2 Things 
In Bunge's ontology, the world consists of two types of things, concrete and 
conceptual. Concrete things are substantial individuals or entities. A concrete thing must 
exist in the real world. However, conceptual things are concepts that people use to 
describe the real world. They only exist in the human mind. 
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A thing can be simple or composite. An individual is composite if and only if it is 
composed of individuals other than itself and the null individual. Otherwise, the 
individual is simple. Simple things are basic objects that cannot be subdivided into other 
objects. A thing can be either a concrete or a conceptual thing. For example, a person is a 
concrete thing. A fami ly, however, can be considered as a composite of persons. 
Things can only be described by properties. If we define all unarized properties 
possessed by a single instance (we discuss this in more detail in the next section) as P and 
all substantial individuals as S, then the totality of unarized properties of a substantial 
individual xeS is called 
p(x)~(Pe P lx possesses P) 
Using the above notation, Bunge defines a thing as follows: 
Definition I Let xeS be a substantial individual. Then the thing X is the individual 
together with its unarized properties: 
X ~ <x, p(x)>. 
The definition of thing indicates that a thing should be described by two parts: an 
individual and a set of properties that the individual possesses. The first part indicates the 
thing itself and the second part describes the characteristics of the thing. In the absence of 
either part, the definition of things wi ll be meaningless. This definition closely resembles 
the logic that people use to describe things in real life. In Figure 12, imagine several 
bowls on a shelf. If a person is referring to the bowl that is depicted with an arrow in 
Figure 12, how does this person let others know which bowl he/she is referring to? This 
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person might designate the bowl as " that center large bowl". In that phrase, ' that . 
bowl' indicates the bowl itself and 'center large' describes the characteristics of this 
bowl. However, neither "that bowl" nor "center large" is sufficient to designate the 
bowl. 
oo CboO 
! 0 
Figure 12: How People Refer to Things 
Bunge posits that individuals have at least one unique property. 
Postulate 3.1 No two substantial individuals have exactly the same properties. That is: 
for all x,y e S, if x 1 y thenp{x) 1 p(y). 
Postulate 3.1 points out that two different substantial individuals must have two different 
sets of properties. An immediate consequence of this is: 
Corollary 3.1 For all x,y eS, ifp(x) = p(y) then x = y. 
Here, Corollary 3. 1 indicates if two substantial individuals have exactly the same 
properties, then they themselves are the same one. Following Postulate 3. 1 and Corollary 
3.1, Bunge concludes as follows: 
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Corollary 3.2 Everything is identical to itself. 
3.3 Properties and Attributes 
3.3.1 Properties 
Properties can only be possessed by things. The existence of properties depends 
on things. There are hvo types of properties: intrinsic (unary) properties and mutual (n-
nary) properties. An intrinsic property only describes the characteristics of a single thing, 
whereas a mutual property refers to the characteristics of more than one thing. For 
example, the hair color of a person is an intrinsic property, but marriage is a mutual 
property since it is referring to a relationship between more than one individual. 
Bunge's ontology categorizes properties into general properties and specific 
properties. lnfonnally, a general property represents a common aspect of a set of 
individuals, but a specific property only represents an aspect of an individual. An 
intrinsic property may be a general property or a specific property. Whether an intrinsic 
property is a general or a specific property is not decided by the concept of the property 
but by the instances that possess it. Bunge defines two kinds of properties: 
Definition 3.2 Let T ~ S be a nonempty set of substantial individuals and P the set of 
unarized substamial properties. Then 
(i) the set of unarized properties of individual x E T is called 
p{x) = {P e P Ix possesses P) 
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(ii) the set ofunarized substantial properties ofT is called 
p(T) = {P E r I Forallxe T, xpossesses p }. 
As described above, in most cases, an intrinsic property possessed by a set of 
individual instances should be a general property; an intrinsic property possessed only by 
a single instance should be a specific property. However, this is not always true. An 
intrinsic property possessed by a set of individual instances may be a specific property. 
For example, people with black hair is a set of individuals. However, the property they 
possessed, with black hair, can be considered a specific property. Bunge's ontology 
considers general and specific property as follows: 
Poswlate 3.2 Let S be the set of substantial individuals or some subset thereof, and letT 
to Z be arbitrary noncmpty sets, equal to or different from S. Then: 
Any substantial property in general is representable as a predicate of the 
fonn 
A: S x T x .. x Z; 
2. Any individual substantial property, or property of a particular substantial 
individual s e S, is representable as the value of an attribute at s, i.e. as 
A(s, t, ... , z), where t e T, ... , z e Z. 
That is, the postulate represents general properties as domains (each as a set of all 
possible values of an independent variable of a function) and specific properties as values 
of general properties, which resembles the representations in the class-based data models. 
Properties may be compatible or incompatible with each other. 
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Definition 3.3 Two properties P1 and P2 are incompatible over a set T ~ S of substantial 
individuals if and only if possessing one of them precludes having the other. They arc 
mutually compatible overT if and only if they are not incompatible overT. 
A property may be preceded by another property. 
Definition 3.4 Let P1 and P2 designate two properties. P1 will be said to precede P2 if and 
only if every thing possessing P2 also possesses P1. 
3.3.2 Attributes 
Everything has properties. However, not every property of a substantial individual 
is human-recognizable; some of them can be ignored. Human-recognized properties are 
called attributes. An attribute is a representation of a property or a set of properties. 
Properties are characteristics of things themselves. However, attributes are characteristics 
assigned to models of things according to human perceptions. 
Humans can only recognize properties by attributes. By this definition, all 
properties possessed by a conceptual thing are attributes. Properties possessed by a 
concrete thing may not be attributes. 
Bunge's ontology fom1alizes the representation of properties as follows: 
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Postulate 3.3 Let P be the set of all properties and A the set of all attributes. The 
representation of properties by attributes is via a funct ion p: P ---+ 2A such that for each P 
e P, p(P) is a set of attributes Ae2" such that for any a e A, a represents P. 
Note that the postulate also indicates that different attributes may represent the same 
property. 
3.4 Relations Between Instances 
Several association theories have been proposed to distinguish relations between 
individuals. Bunge's ontology defines associations by adapting the semi-group theory 
and assembly. 
The term semi-group was defined by Ljapin [58]. A semi-group (monoid) is a 
structure <S, 0 >, where S is a nonempty arbitrary set and 0 a binary operation in S. A 
fin ite semi-group, <S, 0 >, means only a finite number of clements is in the setS. Bunge's 
ontology assumes that 0 operation is commutative (which means: if x, y e S, then x 0 y = 
y 0 x ) and idempotent (which means: for all x e S, x 0 x = x). 
Bunge assumes that the set of individuals is a commutative monoid of 
idempotents and it is suitable to all real things. 
Postulate 3.4 Let S be a non-empty set, 0 a selected element of S, and 0 a binary 
operation in S. Then the structure (/) = <S, 0 , D> satisfies the following conditions: 
(i) (/) is a commutative monoid of idempotents; 
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(ii) S is the set of all substantial or null individuals; 
(iii) The neutral e lement 0 is the null individual; 
(iv) 0 represents the association of individuals; 
(v) the string a1° a2 ° .. . 0 an, where a; e S for I~ i ~ n, represents the 
individual composed of the individuals a 1 to an. 
By Bunge's ontology, individuals can associate to form further individuals. That 
is: if x, y e S, then there is always a z e S which makes z = x 0 y . So, an individual may 
be composite. 
Definition 3.5 An individual is composite if and only if it is composed of individuals 
other than itself and the null individual. Otherwise, the individual is simple. 
Definition 3.6 If x andy are substantial individuals, then xis part of y if and only if x 0 y 
= y. We use a symbol x C y to express this relation. 
The symbol C indicates the relation, which is what we called the part-whole 
relation. The part-whole relation follows the rules: 
(i) for all x e S, C is reflexive. That is x C x ; 
(ii) for al l x,y e S, C is asymmetric. That is ifx -:1: y then x C y =::) -.( y C x); 
(iii) for all x,y, z e S, C is transitive. That is ifx c y &y c z then x c z. 
Following the part-whole relation we can fomully define the simple things as: 
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Dejinilion 3. 7 For any x e S: x is simple if and only if for all x e S, y C x => y = x or y = 
D. 
A thing may be composed of many components. The composition of a composite 
thing is defined as: 
Definition 3.8 The composition of a composite equals the set of its parts. That is if~: S 
- 2s is a function from individuals into sets of individuals, and if for any x e S there is 
~(x)={ye Si y C x }, then ~(x) is called the composition of x. 
A composite thing may possess two types of properties: one is the properties 
possessed by its components. Bunge designates these properties as hereditary properties. 
And the other is the properties that describe the whole composite thing itself. Bunge 
designates the second type as emergent properties. Of course, some composite things may 
not have any hereditary property. However, any composite thing must have at lease one 
emergent property. In fact, the ontology also assumes that the set of properties of a 
composite thing is not equal to that of all the properties of its components. That is: for all 
x,y, z e S, ifz is composed by x andy then p(z) :f:. p(x) u p(y). 
3.5 Class and Kind 
3.5.1 Class 
To define a class, we need to first introduce the concept of scope. 
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Definition 3.9 The scope of a property, P, is the set of things possessing it. That is, the 
scope is a function (jJ: P ~ 2s such that for P e P, lf(P) is the set of a ll individuals 
having property P. 
After introducing scope, Bunge defines a class as follows: 
Definition 3.10 A non-empty subset X of the set of things, S, is called a class if and only 
if there is a property P e P such that X = tAP) . 
Postulate 3.5 The intersection of any two classes of things, if non-empty, is a class. 
Since a class is a scope function t;l(P), or a set of things that possess the same 
property (property P) in their property set, Postulate 5 indicates that for any two 
compatible properties P, Q e P there is at least a third property R e P such that tAR) = 
~P)n ~Q). 
3.5.2 Kind 
A single property determines a class. A set of properties will determine a kind. 
The members of a kind a re all the things that share all the properties in the given set. For 
example if three classes, CJ, C2, and C3, have the intersection, K, then K represents a 
kind (this relation is illustrated in Figure 13). 
Definition 11 Let k: 2r ~ 2s be the function assigning to each nonempty set R e 2r of 
substantial properties the set, k(R) = n t;l(P), of things sharing the properties in R. This 
value k(R) is called the R-kind of things. 
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Figure 13: Class and Kind 
Note that since R is finite, the corresponding R-kind is a class. 
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, we introduced several onlOiogical concepts related to the instance-
based data model. These ontology concepts form the basis for the instance-based data 
model. ln the next chapter we will discuss several semantic extensions of the instance-
based data model based on the concepts outlined in this chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
The Semantic Extension of the Instance-
Based Data Model 
In the last chapter we introduced several ontological concepts related to the 
instance based data model. ln this chapter, we discuss underlying principles of the 
instance-based data model and their semantic extensions: the semantics of the instance 
identifier and the proposal of a possible implementation approach; detai led explanations 
of properties and their relationship; and the definition of classes. We also consider how 10 
represent the real world using the instance-based data model. The research indicates types 
of relationships between instances in the instance-based data model. Finally, we present 
several integrity rules for the instance-based data model to assist future investigation. 
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4.1 Instance Identifier 
In Bunge's ontology, an instance possesses properties and people recognize a 
thing by recognizing its properties. Based on this recognition, Bunge identifies an 
instance as fo llows: 
If x e S is a substantial individual and p(x) 1:: P the collection of its properties, the 
individual together with its properties is called the thing X: X=ctr<X, p{x)> [3]. 
Following Bunge's definition, in the previous chapter we have described an 
instance in an instance-based data model consisting of two parts, an instance identifier 
followed by a set of properties. However, an instance identifier was only referred to but 
neither the definition nor the implementation method was described in detail. Since the 
instance identifier is an important part of an instance, in the next section, we wi ll examine 
instance identifiers to a greater extent. 
4.1.1 Semantics of instance identifiers 
People recognize a thing by its properties; and from the definition of instances, an 
instance cannot be equal to a set of properties. 
An instance identifier has to be outside of the set of the properties of a thing and 
should not be any human-recognized property (or properties) of the instance, otherwise it 
would not be consistent with the definition of instances. In fact, an instance identifier is 
not a property of any thing that occurs naturally, which means instance identifiers do not 
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belong to things themselves, but rather they are the notation that people use to distinguish 
one instance from another. 
Bunge's ontology postulates that 'No two substantial individuals have exactly the 
same properties'. That is: 't/x, ye S, ifx #- y then p{x) #- p(y). On the other hand, 't/x, y 
e S, ifp(x) = p(y), then x = y. The ontology also posn•lates that the totality of things is an 
uncountable set. 
Following the above postulates, the semantics of an instance identifier, which 
people use to distinguish a substantial individual from others, should represent all 
properties of an instance. One should note that the total number of properties of an 
instance may be very large [3], whereas the number of properties people recognize and 
represent via attributes is limited and always less than the total number of properties that 
the instance possesses. 
The expression of an instance in the ontology can be considered a represent-
describe model: that is, the instance identifier represents an instance while a set of 
properties describes the instance. 
ln the instance-based data model, an instance is an instance identifier followed by 
a set of properties. In this expression, the instance identifier and the properties describe 
two different concepts; on one hand, the instance identifier represents the summary of 
aspects of all properties of the thing and these aspects are only detem1ined by the thing. 
But on the other hand, the properties are those that humans use to describe the 
represented particular thing in greater detail. Those properties are the properties of the 
thing recognized by people but not the actual total number of properties of the thing. That 
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is, when we describe an instance, instance_id{P1, P2, ••• , Pn} in the instance-based data 
model, it does not mean that instance_id""{P1, P2, ... , Pn}- Therefore, when people begin 
to recognize more properties of the thing, the attributes increase, approaching the total 
number of properties of the thing, whereas the instance identifier, the representative of 
the thing itself, remains unchanged. 
In summary, the instance identifier is a unique representation of a thing. Humans 
use the representation to indicate a thing. It represents the summary of all the properties 
of the thing. Since only the intrinsic properties are possessed by individual instances, an 
instance identifier should represent all intrinsic properties of the instance. Ideally, an 
instance identifier represents a globally recognized unique property of an instance, which 
can be used to distinguish the instance from others. For example, a human being has one 
unique brain; no one has the same brain as any other. This representation can be shown as 
following: 
An Instance Identifier 
, .. /.//./ 
~"'"""" 
An instance 
,,: 
{A globally recognized unique property _.c:P'-"""'''"';""-' - •• Properties} 
Figure 14: An Instance Identifier Represents a Globally Recognized Unique 
Property 
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4.1.2 Creating an Instance Identifier 
In class-based data models, the most obvious way to create an unambiguous 
identifier for every distinct object is to count the objects and assign each object a value. 
For example, in the relational model, if there is no natural candidate attribute{s) for a key, 
the database system will alternatively create an identification field and use an ordered 
number for each record. 
In the class-based approach, the number indicates there is a difference but such 
difference is ambiguous. Whereas the syntactic difference that each record is different 
from the others is achieved, the semantic difference (how each one is different from the 
others) is not achieved. 
Currently, numerical values are widely used in software design and other industry 
fie lds to distinguish instances from each other. For example, manufacturers of 
automobi les assign a unique serial number on each car they produce. This number works 
as a real world identifier. Whenever a car is built, this serial number will be attached to 
the car and will not change. This number also is location insensitive; that is, the serial 
number remains unchanged wherever this automobi le goes. This kind of system involves 
some aspects of a real instance identifier. It may be different from other approaches, like 
URLs [63], which are location sensitive. For example, the same website stored on 
different servers wi ll have different URLs. 
However, as noted in [64], to create a unique namespace to define instance 
identifiers has proven to be difficult, historically. The problem stems "from a confusion 
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between the abstract idea of a global namespace, and the physical devices that have been 
created over the years to operate in this namespace."[64] 
It is possible, in theory, to create a global namespace using a combination of local 
uniqueness and a tree of identities, like the long distance telephone system, so that any 
user who understands the path down through the tree could understand the identity of the 
infonnation objects at the leaves of the tree. This approach is as shown in Figure 15. 
There are three steps to generate a system: 
I. Each instance gets a locally unique identifier from a local system. 
2. Several local systems combine together to fonn a higher level system (level I). 
3. When there are more than one intermediate level systems in the same level, 
they are combined together to fonn a higher level system until there is only one 
highest level system (the root level). 
Figure 15: Implementation System of Instance Identifiers 
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An instance identifier system is generated from the lowest level to the top level. 
After the system is built, an instance can be identified from the top level down to the leaf 
level, as indicated by the dash arrows. Our approach is also call ed a hierarchical 
approach. 
4.2 Properties and Their Relationships 
People recognize a thing by recognizing its properties. Properties always be long 
to instances. However, as Bunge's ontology indicates, attributes of things are only the 
aspects of things that humans recognize. So, to describe real world things, we have to 
define what an attribute is and to find relationships between them. 
Corollary 4. 1 Attributes are concepts that humans use to describe the real world things. 
ln Bunge's ontology, human recognized properti es are called attributes. However, 
to be consistent with the previous papers of the instance-based data model [2], we sti ll 
use the name 'property' not 'attribute' for these type of properties. In the following, 
unless otherwise specified, the tem1 property wi ll imply attributes. In contrast, we use 
'real property' to indicate properties possessed by things. 
Technically, a property is a concept possessed by instances and recognized by 
people. However, as suggested in the previous section, a real property of things may be 
represented by a set of properti es and several properties may represent the same real 
property. 
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Previously, two types of properties, general property and specific property, were 
distinguished. A general property represents a domain which may be shared by a set of 
individuals, while a specific property represents one fundamental aspect of an individual, 
i.e. the aspect cannot be further divided. A property can be either general or specific. 
However, it is difficult to define general and specific properties in tenn of words instead 
of mathematical expressions. In class-based models, general properties are interpreted as 
attributes of classes, which describe entity types, and specific properties are interpreted as 
values of general properties. For example, weight may only be manifested as a numerical 
value in the unit of pounds. Consider the specific property (weight, 150lb), or 150 pounds 
in weight. Here, the property weight is a general property whereas 150\b is a specific 
property and it can be considered as a value of the property weight. Any further 
specialization of 1501b in such systems is impossible. Following the above logic, the 
property (weight, \50lb) is a specific property as well, as further specialization is not 
pennissible in this property. 
A class may not be solely based on general properties. In Bunge's ontology, a class 
is a set of individuals that share the same set of properties, which is in the class 
definition. The shared properties can be either general properties or specific properties. 
However, in class-based models we have to generate attributes to describe properties of 
the class and assign values to each individual in the class. In this case, a class definition 
can only be on general properties. Returning to the weight example, if we need to define 
a class that includes everything that has the weight of 150lb, we have to use the property 
(weight, 1501b) which is a specific property as discussed above. However, a general 
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property is required for class definition, but any further specialization is not permissible 
for specific properties. The simplest way to resolve the situation would be to introduce 
another specific value for each individual instance, so that the property, (weight, 1501b), 
can be used to generate the specific values. For the above weight problem, the class 
definition could be ((weight, 150lb)) but any instance that possesses this property will be 
denoted as ((weight, 150lb), true). Of course, this approach is both redundant and 
increases the required space. Parsons and Wand introduced two-layered approach to solve 
the problem [2]. In their approach a class definition can use both general properties and 
specific properties. 
Instead of general and specific relationships, the very simple relationships of 
properties in the class-based models, we define two types of relationships between 
properties in the instance-based data model. We call them compatible-related and non-
compatible-related relationships between properties. 
Compatible-related relationships depend on human recognition of properties. 
They describe how the relationships between the concepts of properties are related. Three 
types of compatible-related relationships ex ist between properties: belongs, joint, and 
discrete. If the set of concepts of one property is a subset of concepts of another property, 
then we say the first property belongs to the second property. The belongs relationship 
between properties may have hierarchical structures. For example, if there arc two 
properties, weight and weight is 150/b, then these two properties have a belongs 
relationship. They also have the hierarchical structure of concepts. If the concepts of two 
properties have an intersection, the two properties are called joint properties. 
53 
Extend!ngthe!nstance-based datamodel:Semantics,performanceandsecurityconsiderations 
Subsequently, if the concepts of two properties do not have any intersection, they are 
called discrete properties. In our research, we will largely deal with properties that either 
have the belongs relationship or have the discrete relationship. If there is a j oint 
relationship between two properties in a system, we will translate them into discrete 
properties. The translation is based on Bunge's ontological assumption that for any nvo 
compatible properties P, Q e P there is at least a third property R e P such that 
q.:(R)=q:(P) ri q:(Q). The steps of translation are shown in Figure 16. The concepts of 
property P1 and P2 have an intersection. A new property, P3, manifests the joint part and 
we redefine the rest of P1 and P2 as P1' and P2'. After the translation, the three properties, 
P1 ', P2 ', and P3, are discrete properties. 
In traditional class-based models, the relationships of properties are expressed 
between classes. After the schema is defined, relationships between properties are fixed, 
which means only compatible-related relationships are between them. 
The non-compatible relationship bet\veen properties was first introduced in the 
IBDM. To bring more clarity into explaining these kinds of relationships, the IBDM used 
Bunge's ontological concept of scope. 
Figure 16: Transforming Joint Properties to Discrete Properties 
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In the IBDM, an instance may gain or lose properties. This enables dynamic 
modification of the scope of a property P, the set of instances which possess the property 
P. 
Now, we introduce two non·compatible relationships between properties, 
preceding and preceded [57]. 
Let ~(P) denote the power set of P. Then we have: 
Definition 4.1: The preceding properties of P in P are defined by the function Preceding: 
r~ s(P), such that Preceding(P)~(Qe PIScope(Q) ;;,Scope(P)). 
Definition 4.2: The preceded properties of a property P are all properties for which P is a 
preceding property. That is, the function Preceded: P-+~(P) such that 
Preccdcd(P)~(Qe PIScope(P) ;;,Scope(Q)). 
Definition 4.1 indicates that a set of instances possessing property P may possess 
other properties, Qe P, such that {Qe P[Scope(Q) ~Scope(P)}. Conversely, the preceded 
properties of a property P are those properties such that an instance possessing any of 
those properties must possess P. Note that whether one property precedes other properties 
or is preceded by other properties is based on which instances possess the properties. It 
does not matter whether these properties are in the same domain or not. So, we name 
them non·compatible relationships. Since an instance may gain or lose properties in the 
IBDM, the above hvo operations, Preceding(P) and Preceded(P), will generate outputs 
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that will dynamica lly reflect the semantics, which instances possess P also possess some 
other properties (Preced ing(P)) or instances possess other property also possess P. 
Several technologies, such as data mining [65] and data warehousing [66] in 
particular, have been suggested recently in attempt to ana lyze a dynamic relat ionship 
between properties. Those technologies analyze attributes of instances to get related 
results. For example, a class ic AI problem is market analysis: Who is most likely to buy a 
computer? A student, a young man with great cred it, or a middle-aged white-collar man 
[67]? To tackle this kind of problem, numerous learning methods such as supervised 
learn ing [68] and non-supervised learning [69] have been suggested. By ana lyzing one 
set of values of an attribute (or a set of attributes) with values of other attributes, those 
approaches try to get useful infonnation from data. However, in the class-based models, 
the stati stical analys is is done on values of instances. The values are based on the schema 
of classes to wh ich the instances belong. We believe that this severely limits the analys is 
capability in class-based models, and by using preceding and preceded relati onsh ips, the 
IBDM generates more useful infonnation between properties. 
4.3 Relationships Between Instances 
In the relational data model, a relationship is defined between entity types. This is 
why sometimes designers find it difficult to define relationsh ips in this mode l. It has 
always been a great confusion to designers whet her a relationship is binary, ternary or 
even more complex [I]. However, expressing relationships in the instance-based data 
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Figure 17: Representing the World at the Instance Level 
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model is relatively simple. We need only use the binary relationship to represent all 
relationships in a system. 
Bunge's ontology assumes that "1he world is formed of 1hings and relarionships 
beflveen rhem, and only binary relationship exists between things" [3}. It also indicates 
that ''one thing associating with another thing will form a new thing (conceptual thing)" 
[3]. Database systems also assume that things associated with each other do not erase any 
intrinsic properties of things themselves. Following the assumptions above, we express 
the world of things in two parts: things and associations between things. According to 
Bunge, an association between basic things fonns a higher level conceptual thing. Each 
level of things stores its own information in its level. So, the whole world in the instance-
based data model is modeled as a binary tree structure, as shown in Figure 17. All the 
basic things are on the bottom level (leaf nodes). All the internal nodes are concepts 
abstracted from the basic things. Finally, the root is the model of the real world. Our 
approach to abstract concepts of things is only to store binary relationships of the lower 
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level th ings into hi gher levels. Higher level re lationships can be formed between things in 
multipl e levels. For example, between the neighboring levels in level I, thing 10 is 
abstracted from two lower leve l things 5 and 6. However, in leve l 2, thing 12 is fanned 
by thin g 10 and thing 7. So, thing 12, in level2, is actuall y fo rmed by three things, 5, 6, 
and 7, in leve l 0; that is, a ternary relationship forms between leve l 0 and level 2. 
A system may not store all internal nodes . For example, it might fonn the tree 
structure shown in Figure 18. A simple comparison with Figure 17 reveals that two 
interna l things, things 8 and 10, are missing. A miss ing internal thing (e.g. thing 10) 
means the system does not conta in any information relating onl y thing 5 and thing 6 
(from which thing I 0 is abstracted) . However, for the implementation, when more than 
two things fonn a higher level thing, it is also safe to assume an abstract thing ex ists 
between two things in lower level so that we can always express the fanned thing 
between two things as we showed in Figure 17. 
13 
Figure 18: Data Representati on at the Instance Leve l 
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A family The third level 
The second level 
I 
/"\ 
A young man A young woman A girl The fi rst level 
Figure 19: Three-level Structure of a Family 
/'\ The second level 
A young man A y ung woman A girl The first level 
Figure 20: Two-level Structure of a Family 
We have an example to illustrate the tree structure formed in the instance level as 
follows: 
Assume there are three instances: a young man, a young woman, and a girl. The 
man and the woman are married and the girl is their child. We could express the 
relationship between these instances in three levels as Figure 19. That is, in the bottom 
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level, we have three instances: a young man, a young woman, and a girl. In the second 
level we have an instance: the young man and the woman married fanning a couple. ln 
the top level we have an instance: the couple and the child fonn a family. Of course, 
sometimes the middle relationship is missed. In our case, three instances may have 
relationships in two levels as shown in Figure 20: at the bottom level there arc three 
instances: a young man, a young woman, and a girl; at the top level they fonn a family. 
After defining relationships between instances, the relationship between two 
individual instances is represented in the highest level thing of the path connecting the 
two instances. We refer to this thing as the view-relationship of the individuals. In a 
database, all the internal nodes represent view-relationships of individuals. The difference 
between the levels of the individuals and their view-relationship represents how closely 
the individuals are related. A lower number means they are closely related to each other. 
A higher number means their relationship is more distant. 
4.4 Class Identifier 
In the instance-based data model, we state that a class is a class identifier 
followed by a set of properties. The semantics of the class identifier is different from the 
instance identifier. An instance identifier is a representation of an abstraction of all the 
(possibly very large number of) properties of the instance itself whether or not they have 
been recognized by people. Thus, the semantics of an instance identifier docs not equal to 
the properties that have been recognized by people. In contrast, by Bunge's ontology, a 
class is a set of instances which possess a common set of properties. A class identifier is a 
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label that people use to indicate common finite properties recognized by people and 
shared by a set of instances. So, the semantics of a class identifier is equal to its 
definition, which is a set of common properties recognized by people. 
Since a class identifier only expresses a finite set of properties recognized by 
humans, its implementation is much easier than the implementation of an instance 
identifier. To do this, we need first somehow to map the class identifier to its definition. 
This mapping should be onto, but is not necessarily one to one. Here, onto means a class 
identifier must map to a set of properties. However, in some cases, it is possible that 
several class identifiers map to the same set of properties. 
4.5 Representing Data Semantics to Support Queries 
ln class-based models, the semantics of data is represented by the schema 
defining classes to which instances belong. One schema and its bounded data can only 
express one level of semantics. The models have no way to answer queries in different 
semantic levels. For example, if a system stores some information about persons and 
there is a field to express how tall this person is in centimeters, even a simple query 
' identify the tall person' cannot be answered automatically. The system docs not have the 
ability to transfonn the semantics of tali into centimeters. In the instance-based data 
model, properties can be preceded by a set of other properties. Back to the above 
question, in the instance-based data model, we can define a property as tall, which can be 
preceded by any one whose height is more than 180 em. So, for the query 'tall person', 
any one who is higher than 180 em will be in the results set. A property also can precede 
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other properties [57]. Using this method, a class can be defined as merely one property 
that precedes a set of properties, which are common properties of the instances in the 
class. Reducing properties in a class definition will speed up querying and updating the 
members of the class. For example, if a class can be defined using only one property in 
the instance-based data model, the speed to query the membership of the class in this 
model will be as fast as the relational data model [70]. 
4.6 Integrity Rules 
As we have discussed, the instance-based data model separates instances from 
classes and stores infonnation about instances and classes in two layers, the instance 
layer and the class layer. To guarantee the consistency of data in databases, we have to 
build rules for the model. There are four integrity rules: three for components of the 
instance-layer and one for classes in the class-layer. 
Rule 4.1 (Instance integrity) An instance i can be inserted into an instance-based database 
if and only if no identical instance j exists in the database. This rule can be formally 
expressed as: 
For all Pke P, k e (N is a natural number), and i,j e I, if i possesses P., andj 
possesses P., are always true, then i = j. 
Rule 4.1 guarantees that no duplicated object(s) exists in a database. It matches 
the semantics of the instance identifier. Since an instance identifier includes all the 
features of the instance and no instance should have completely the same features as 
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other instances in the real world, rule 4.1 assumes uniqueness of the identification of each 
instance. 
Rule 4.2 (Property Integrity) : The instance i{Pp I Pp e P}satisfies property integrity if and 
onlyiffor anyPpE i,andPqE i,p :/= q, then Ppn Pq=$. 
Rule 4.2 states that a property Pp of an instance i cannot be in a database if it 
already has property P P• or the instance i possesses other properties which is a compatible 
property ofPw 
Rule 4.3 (Association integrity) An association (a murual property), mp, of two instances, 
i{Ppi PPe P}and i'{Pp·I Pp·E P},exists ifandonly if: 
(a) i and i ' exist in database 
(b) No another mutual property, mp', between i and i' exists such that mp n mp' 
Rule 4.3(b) follows the property integrity rule. We assume that associations 
between things fonn conceptual things in a higher level. Properties of higher level 
conceptual things should have the same constraints compared to basic things. Rule 4 .3(a) 
means associations can be formed between things only if the things exist in the database. 
The meaning of this rule is similar to the requirement of referential integrity in the 
relational model. 
Rule 4.4 (Class Integrity Rule): A class C{P111 Pp e P}satisfies class integrity if and only 
if the following expressions are always true: 
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a. For any property Ppe C, Scope(P11)if;$ 
b. ForanypropertiesP11 e C,and P11 e C,pif;q, then Pp n Pq = $. 
c. If {Ptlk= l , ... n} is a subset of properties which define class C, then 
Scope(P,J r. Scope(P2) r. ... r. Scope(P") * $. 
In the instance·based data model, the basic information is stored in the instance 
layer. The class layer is generated from the instance layer. Rule 4.4(a) guarantees that 
only properties possessed by some instances can be used to define classes. Rule 4.4(b) is 
similar to Rule 4.2 (property integrity) in the instance layer. Rule 4.4(c) guarantees that 
any defined class must have some instances belonging to it. 
4.7 Summary 
In this chapter, we discussed several semantic extensions of the instance·based 
data model and the recognition concepts based on the instance·based data model. The 
semantic extension of the components of the instance-based data model clarifies the 
definition of the model and the implementation of the components simplifies the 
applications to real database systems. We also discussed re lationships between instances 
in the instance-based data model and expressed these relationships in a balanced tree. The 
discussion provides a clear approach to build relationship between instances as well as a 
means to define how an instance is closely re lated to others by using the tree. Hopefully, 
this will provide some insights on how to query data efficiently in the instance·based data 
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model. In the final secti on, we presented several integrity rules for the instance-based 
data model that reduce the redundant data and make the data more consisten t. 
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Chapter 5 
Query Performance in the IBDM 
We have discussed in the previous chapters how different data models are suited 
for different applications and how, unfortunately, no data model is best suited for a ll 
applications. For example, a query using the hierarchical data model is genera lly faster 
than one using the relational model; however, the flexibility in the former model is 
considerably less than in the latter. The 180M provides much additional flexibility to 
users relative to previous relational data model, but what is its efficiency compared with 
the class-based models? In this chapter, we investigate the query ability of the IBDM 
compared to the re lational model. The comparison consists of two parts: the first is a 
theoretical comparison and the second is testing on sample data. The comparison will 
suggest some suitable application areas of the IBDM. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Currently, SQL or SQL-like query languages are widely used to manage 
databases. When we query a database using SQL, we always need a Select clause, which 
is equivalent to a relational algebra project operation, to indicate what attributes we need 
to appear in the result set. The results of an SQL query will be a new temporary table that 
includes all attributes in the Select section. So, in an SQL query a user is looking for a set 
of attribute values that satisfy certain conditions or restrictions (specified in the Where 
clause). However, in relational database systems a record is stored together as a tuple. 
Whether a user queries only one attribute or all the attributes of a tuple, the system needs 
to access the whole tuple (that is, all the attributes of the table). This is a time-consuming 
process, especially when a table is so large that it cannot be fully loaded into the memory. 
Using indexes may speed up some query processing. When attributes arc indexed, 
queries on these attributes only need to search a part of the records to get results. 
However, indexes are not an original technology of the relational model; they are 
structures stored in a database to increase the performance of certain queries (7 1]. 
Indexes also have the drawback that they reduce the perfonnance of updates, as the 
indexes themselves also need to be updated. So, when using indexes in a rela1ional 
database there are always some questions. For example, how many indexes are needed? 
Which attributes should be indexed? Meanwhi le, when a query predicate is not very 
selective, an index would not be useful and the entire relation would be scanned. In this 
case, the relational data model will have poor perfom1ance. 
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Recently, Cwstore [72] has provided a method called "columnwstores" to increase 
performance on analytical workloads such as those found in data warehouses, decision 
support, and business intelligence applications in the relational model. The idea of 
"column·stores" is to store records in the column format instead of the row format of the 
relational data model so that the method wi ll provide more efficient performance on some 
queries. However, as a method, "columnwstores" lacks semantics of several operations. 
For example, what is a record 10? I-I ow is it generated? The method also has a drawback 
for mapping a record to its logical schema. 
Compared to the relational model, the instancewbased data model provides a new 
way to access a portion of the attribute values of a class (i.e., a table in the relational 
model) to answer a query. In the following section, we compare the differences between 
methods of relational queries and the instance·based queries for two basic SQL queries: 
select and project query, and join query. 
5.2 Environment of the Comparison 
We begin by defining an environment that is convenient for our comparison. In a 
real database system, data types of attributes arc not the same. Currently, commercial 
databases support various data types which we may use for storing infonnation. In most 
cases, the number of bits required to store a value of an attribute in a table is much larger 
than an instance identifier, which is a numeric type. For example, a company database as 
shown Figure 2 1 in Fundamentals of Database Systems [I], the attribute first name is 
varchar(15), which needs 2*15""30 bytes in Java, the minit needs 2 bytes, the !name 
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needs 2• !5=30 bytes, and so on. The total number of bytes needed for this table is 192 
bytes per tuple. Since there are I 0 attributes in the table, the average number of bytes 
needed to store a value of an attribute in the employee table is 19.2 bytes, which is nearly 
five times more in size compared to the instance identifier (nonnally it needs 4 bytes). 
Create table employee 
( fname varchar(15) not null, 
minit char, 
!name varchar( 15) not null, 
ssn char(9) not null, 
bdate date, 
address varchar(30), 
sex char, 
salary decimal( I0,2), 
superssn char(9), 
dno int not null, 
constrain! empsuper _pk 
primary key (ssn) ); 
Figure 21: An Employee Table 
class 1 class 2 
propertyl·ID Propertyl·ID 
property2·ID Property3·ID 
fmutualpropertyl·ID mutua!property l ·ID 
Figure 22: The Second Data Structure of IBDM [70] 
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However, to simplify the comparison, we assume that all the attributes have the 
same data type; they have the same data type as the instance identifier, and the length of 
that data type is q bits. Also, we assume each class (table) has m attributes and n records. 
Then, to store a table, in the relational database we need at least q*m*n bits, but in the 
instance-based data model (we use the second data struchire introduced in [70], shown in 
Figure 22, for the comparison) we need 2*q*m*n bits. It seems that the instance-based 
data model needs double the space to store the data. However, when we consider more 
than one related table, the relational model needs to repeated ly store some infonnation in 
both tables, for example, the foreign key attributes; therefore, the instance-based data 
model needs somewhat Jess than twice the storage space than that of the relational model. 
In this chapter we compare the original relational database model with the IBDM; 
the comparison only uses indexes of the primary attribute(s). 
5.3 Select and Project Queries 
In the relational data model, for any query purpose, the system needs to load all 
the records into the memory first, which requires time (qmn)*v (v is the time needed for 
loading one bit of data to memory). After loading the data to memory, the system will 
compare the cond itions in the Where clause; we assume this step takes time u for one 
comparison. There are n records to be compared, the ti me needed for this process is n*u. 
We will ignore the time spent to display the results. So the total time for the select/ 
project query in the relational data model is: 
(qmn)*v + n*u (I) 
70 
Extendingtheinstance-baseddatamodei:Semantics,performanceand securityconsiderations 
In the instance-based database, the data that the system needs to load into memory 
for the query arc the values of the attributes that are in the Select clause and Where 
clause. If we assume there are p attributes to answer a query, the data size loaded is: 
2*q*p*n. Thus, the time required to load those data is: (2qpn)* v. After loading, we need 
to combine values of attributes to records. This process will consume time (we assume 
data is stored in a a+ tree): 
n*(p-l)* log8 (2qpn)*u (where 8 is the page size of the operating system). 
Then the comparison takes time 2*n*u (one for value comparison, one for class check). 
So, the total time is: 
(2qpn)* 1>+ n*(p-l)* loga(2qpn)*u + 2*n*u. (2) 
In expressions ( I) and (2), the only variable is n. By the theory of complexity [73] 
when n grows larger, the value of expression (2) will grow at a much faster rate than 
expression ( I), so that the value of (2) is larger than (I). This is true when n is large 
enough. However, how large is large enough? With the increasing memory capability of 
computers, is there an 11 large enough to make the value of expression (2) greater than the 
value of expression ( I)? We know that in a system the capacity of the memory is always 
less than the hard drive (typically less than I percent) and the access speed of the hard 
drive is less than that of the memory (typically less than one millionth). So, in a system 
we have to consider both factors. If we assume the memory size is M, then the time 
needed for relational system will be: 
(qmn!M-I)*v *M*2+ n*u. (3) 
For the instance-based data model, the time needed will be: 
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(2qpnfM· I)* v*M*2+ n*(p·l)*log8(2qpn)*u + 2*n*u. (4) 
Then the question becomes: how large must n be to make (3) less than (4)? That is: 
(qnmiM·I )*v *M*2+n*u < (2qpniM·1)* v*M*2+n*(p·1)*1og8 (2qpn)*u + 2*n*u (5) 
Add v *M*2 on both sides: 
(qmn/M)*v *M*2+n*u < (2qpn!M)* v*M*2+n*(p. J)* Iogo(2qpn)*u + 2*n*u 
Divide by n on both sides: 
(qm/M)*v *M*2+u < (2qp!M)* v*M*2+(p·l)* logo(2qpn)*u + 2*u 
Delete M on both sides; 
(qm)*v *2+u < (2qp)* v*2+(p·l)*logo(2qpn)*u + 2*u 
Move the left to the right and switch the sides: 
(2qp)*v*2+(p· l )*log0(2qpn)*u + 2*u· (qm)*v *2 · II > 0 
That is: 
(2qp)*v*2· (qm)*v *2 + u + (p·l)* log0(2qpn)*u > 0 
Finally, Expression (5) can be simplified into: 
((2p·m)* v *2 *q + u) + (p· I)*Jog13(2qpn)*u > 0 
Since p>=l, we know that when p= l , expression (6) will become expression (7): 
(m·2)* v *2 *q > u 
(6) 
(7) 
In the relational database we have m>=2 {the number o f attributes in a table is at 
least 2), and in most cases m>2. We also know that q>O (the number of bits required to 
store a value of an attribute is always positive) and v > u (loading data from hard drive to 
memory is always slower than computing). So, in this case, expression (7) wi ll be true 
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whatever value 11 adopts. That is to say that the instance-based data model wilt always be 
faster than the relational model when we query only one attribute. 
In the next step, we will consider the situation of p> 1. In this case, (6) can be 
simplified as follows: 
log6(n) > ((m-2p)' v'2 ' q /u- 1)/(p- 1) - log6(2qp) (8) 
On the right hand of expression (8), since on average, a query will not select more than 
ten attributes, we assume p< IO. We also assume that the space needed to store an 
attribute is not more than 20 bits (q<20). Moreover, the page size of the operating system 
is assumed to be larger than 32K (8 >32K). Therefore, we can reasonably assume that 
Jog8 (2qp) is much Jess than 0.01. Let L = v*2 *q lu, then L>> IOO (v will be millions o f 
times larger than u). Then we consider three situations: 
l) m>2p 
This is the most general case when users query a database. In this case, the right 
hand of expression (8) will be larger than 10 (m-2p>l , L= v*2 *q lu >IOO,p-1<9). So, if 
the left hand side in expression (8) is greater than the right hand side, n must be larger 
than 8 10. Even if 8 equals to 32K (which is the minimum value that 8 could take), 8 10 
will be bigger than 1045. In reality, there is no possibi lity of having a database that 
includes equal to/more than I 045 records in a table. So, there hardly exist any n to 
establish expression (8). This implies that there is no 11 in any real system that will result 
in a query in the relational data model being faster than the same query in the instance-
based data model. That is, when query attributes are less than half of the attributes in a 
table, the instance-based data model will be faster than the relational model. 
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2) m=2p 
In this case, expression (8) will become: 
log0{n) > - 1/{p-1) - log0{2qp) 
Since p<lO, a re latively smalln will make the left hand side in expression (8) larger than 
the right. In other words, we do not need a large number of records in a table to make 
query in the relational data model faster than the instance-based data model. That is, 
when query attributes are equal to half of the attributes in a table, queries in the relational 
data model faster than the instance-based data model. 
3) m<2p 
In this case, the absolute value of t he right hand of expression (8) will be larger 
than I 0 but it is negative. So, n only needs to be larger than I or 2 for expression (8) to 
hold. This implies, when query attributes are more than half of the attributes in a table, 
queries in the relational data model will be faster than the instance-based data model. 
As explained before, in a real database the average size of attributes is more than 
3-4 times of the size of the instance identifier. So, the results of the above comparison 
should be: 
when m> 1.25p tol.33p, que1y on the instance-based data model will be faster 
than the relational model; when m<=l.25p to 1.33p, query on the relational model will 
be faster than the instance-based data model. 
Although, the above comparison only shows one condition in which case the 
instance-based data model will be faster than the relational model, a broad range o f 
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queries fit this case. Thus in the most cases, queries on the instance-based data model are 
faster than queries on the relational model. 
5.4 Join Query 
There are two kinds of join operations in the relational data model: join on the key 
attribute and join on non-key attribute. However, in the instance-based data model they 
are the same. 
5.4.1 Join on the Key Attribute 
In the relational data model, the system needs to load at least two tables. So it 
needs time: 2*(qmn)*v. Then the join operation needs time: n• log3(qmn)*u. So, the total 
time needed is: 
( 10) 
5.4.2 Join on non-Key Attribute 
In the relational data model, the system still needs to load at least two tables, but 
the join operation itself needs more time. In this case, the join operation needs time 
n*n*u. In total, the time needed is: 
( II ) 
ln the instance-based data model, the system only needs to load p attributes plus a 
mutual property. So, the loading time needed is: (p+ I )qn* v. And there is no join needed 
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in the instance-based data model. The only operation is a select operation (on key 
attribute), so, the needed time is: u* log8(n). Then the total time needed is: 
(p+ I)qn* v + u*log8(n) ( 12) 
Since p<m, (12) wi ll always be less than ( 10) or (II). 
5.5 Test 
A direct comparison of query performance of an instance-based DBMS with a 
relational DBMS is di fficu lt, since commercial relational DBMSs incorporate proprietary 
query optimization techniques. In contrast, query optimization for the instance-based data 
model has not yet been studied. To provide a baseline for comparison, we implemented 
an instance-based data structure using a commercial relational DBMS based on the 
second data structure described earlier. We used a relational database to manage most 
parts of the instance-layer data, and binary and ternary relations to store properties. We 
implemented each intrinsic property as a binary relation with the property name as the 
name of the relation. In each binary relation, there is a key attribute Instance _ID and an 
attribute Value. The key attribute lnstance_ID stores the identifiers of instances that 
possess the property, while the attribute Value stores the value of the property for each 
instance possessing the property. We implemented each mutual property as a ternary 
relation. Each ternary relation has three attributes. Instancc_IDI and lnstance_ID2 fonn a 
key o f the relation and indicate two instances related to each other by this mutual 
property. Also, another attribute Value in the relation is used to store a value o f the 
mutual property between the instances (if there is one). In this way, we implemented all 
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the architectural components below the Query or Update Algorithm in the instance layer 
of Figure 23 on a relational platform. However, the relational platfo rm cannot implement 
Algorithm Manageme~t 
Data Storage 
Figure 23: Architecture of the lnstance~based Database System 
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all parts of the instance-layer. We implemented the Query or Update Algorithm and the 
instance engine of the instance-layer using a separate program that interacted with the 
relational database. The Query or Update Algorithm includes the methods and algorithms 
that relate to spec ifi c query or update operations and a translator that translates these 
methods and algorithms to relational operations. 
5.5.1 Environmentofthe Test 
We used MySQL [86J as the underl ying platfonn to implement two databases, 
one based on the relational model (referred to as Rdb) and the other based on the 
instance-based model (referred to as idb). To compare query perfonnance, both databases 
were based on the Sca lab le Wisconsin benchmark data set [56]. This data set includes 
three relations, ONEKTUP, TENKTUPl, and TENKTUP2. Each relation is composed 
of the thirteen integer attributes and three 52 byte string attributes. ONEKTUP has 
100,000 records. TENKTUPl and TENKTUP2 both have 1,000,000 records. The 
structure of each relat ion is shown in Figure 24. Further details are avai lab le in [56]. 
In the instance-based implementation, we used MySQL to store the instance-layer 
data, consist ing of all the intrinsic properties and the mutual property. Each intrinsic 
property was implemented as a binary table, where the table name is a Wisconsin 
attri bute name, the instance-id is an integer (not an ex isting identifier from one of the 
Wiscons in relations), and the property value is the value of the correspondi ng attribute. A 
mutual property was implemented as a ternary tabl e to serve as a join attribute. However, 
unlike the relational model, we stored the class layer information in a class folder. Each 
78 
Extending the instance-based data model: Semantics, performance and security considerations 
class was stored as a fi le with the class definition under the class fo lder. Therefore, three 
relations in the relational database become three classes in the instance-based model: 
Tenkl {unique2}, Tenk2 {unique22}, and Onek{unique23} .A class is defined as 
all common properties of a set of instances. However, for efficiency purposes, we 
essentially index class membership using a single property that, in tum, is possessed by 
all instances possessing all the properties that define the class. 
Attribute Name Range of Values Order Comment 
unique1 0 - (MAXTUPLES - 1) random unique, random 
order 
unique2 0- (MAXTUPLES-1) sequential unique, sequential 
two 0-1 random (unique1 mod 2) 
four 0-3 random (unique1 mod 4) 
ten 0-9 random (unique1 mod 10) 
twenty 0-19 random (uniquel mod 20) 
one Percent 0-99 random (unique1 mod 100) 
tenPercent 0-9 random (unique1 mod 10) 
twentyPercent 0-4 random (unique1 mod 5) 
fiftyPercent 0-1 random (unique1 mod 2) 
unique3 0- (MAXTUPLES-1) random unique1 
evenOnePercent 0, 2,4, . . ,198 random (one Percent 2) 
oddOnePercent 1, 3,5, 
. -. '199 random (onePercent . 2) +1 
stringu1 random candidate key 
stringu2 random candidate key 
string4 cyclic 
Figure 24: Attribute Specification of Scalable Wisconsin Benchmark Relations 
We applied the modified Wisconsin benchmark queries to both databases. The 
Rdb versions of the queries used are listed in the Appendix. The idb equivalent versions 
were constructed as relational algebra operations (and consequently SQL queries) over 
the properties implemented as relations. The main activity in constructing these queries 
was to translate a property selected in iQL to a corresponding relational table storing that 
property. We tested all queries in the two databases running on a personal computer in 
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the Windows 7 environment. The processor of the computer is Pentium(R) Dual-Core 
CPU T4400 at 2.20GHz. 
5.5.2 Results of the Test 
We tested all queries in the two databases. Selected comparative results are shown 
in Figures 25-27. Complete results are provided in the Appendix. 
Q ueries 1 to 4 
Number of Attributes Projected 
Figure 25: Non-indexed property qucries1 
30 
-rdb 
-idb 
Number of Attributes Projected 
Figure 26: Non-Clustered- Index property queries 
1 Clustered-index properties provide similar results (see Appendix). 
80 
Extendingtheinstance-baseddatamodel:Semantics, performanceandsecurity conslderntions 
From Figure 25 (and the Appendix) we can see that for Non-indexed property 
queries and Clustered-Index property queries, idb is faster than Rdb when a small number 
of attributes is projected in the query. These results are somewhat less favorable to the 
IBDM than we would generally expect to observe because a higher proportion of the 
attributes in the Wisconsin benchmark ( 13 of 16) are of integer data type than would 
typically be the case in most business datasets. As analyzed in the previous section, if a 
table has more text attributes than integer attributes, the instance-based model will 
perform better than the relational model. We believe that if hal for more of the attributes 
in the relations were text, idb will be faster than Rdb on projections of 40% or more of 
attributes. 
Queries 35-37 
0 5 
,; 4 t--
E ' >= 
Clustered-Index Non-Ciu~tcrcd-lndcx Non-Index 
Figure 27: Update Operations 
Figure 26 indicates that for Non-Clustered-Index property queries, the idb model 
has a greater performance advantage over the Rdb relative to clustered-index property 
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queries. In this case, the idb is faster than the Rdb even on projection of more than 40% 
of the attributes of a class. 
Figure 27 indicates that the idb and the Rdb have comparable query perfom1ance 
on clustered-index update operati ons (simi lar results hold for aggregation queries - see 
Appendix). However, when these operati ons deal with non-clustered index or non-
indexed data, the idb is much faster than the Rdb. 
Overall , these results provide ample query perfo rmance support for the viabi lity 
of instance-based data structures as a mechanism for organ izing data. By implementing 
these structures in a relati onal database environment and comparing performance to an 
equ iva lent benchmark based on a traditi onal relational (multi-attribute) design, we prove 
that the instance-based structures can perfo rm better than the re lati onal model in some 
queries. We believe that, with a nat ive DBM S implementation and the development of 
appropri ate query optimization techniques for the IBDM, further gains in perfonnance 
over relat ional data structures are possible. Our objective was not to show that instance-
based structures outperfo m1 class-based ones on all operations, but to show that 
reasonable performance could be achieved on a range of operati ons. 
Notwithstanding this, the results of this comparison are quite interesting, and 
immediately suggest an approach to substantiall y improve database perfo rmance within a 
traditi onal relational database management system for queries that project a few attributes 
from a class. Th is requires reconceptual izing traditi onal thinking about database design. 
Unlike traditional methods in which a class-based conceptual model deve loped using the 
Entity-Relationship model is converted to a class-based relat ional design, our proposed 
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alternative would implement an instance-and-property based design based on binary and 
temary relations, with some class support defined outside the DBMS. 
5.5.3 Summary of the Test 
We show how an instance-based database can be supported using a relational 
database platform and demonstrate that this approach leads to faster query processing 
than an equivalent relational design, even though it does not provide "native" support of 
the !HOM. From this result, we conclude that database query perfonnance can be 
improved by taking an instance-based approach to implementing a design using a 
relational database management system. 
5.6 Summary 
Ln this chapter, we compared the query perfonnance in the lBDM with that in the 
relational model. A theoretical comparison and an empirical simulation show that the 
instance-based data model is faster than the relational model on some typical queries. 
Although we did not compare all possible operations, the results demonstrate the speed 
advantage of the instance-based data model. That is, the instance-based data model has 
much more flexibility than the relational model [2] and it can perfonn better than the 
relational model in certain applications. 
83 
Extending the instance-based data model: Semantics, performance and security considerations 
Chapter 6 
Multilevel Security Model 
Multilevel database systems have been proposed to address the increased security 
needs of database systems. The word "multi level" means that there are multiple clearance 
levels. A multilevel database is intended to provide the security needs for database 
systems that contain data at a variety of security classifications and serve a set of users 
having different clearances [74}. In multilevel databases, higher-level security users can 
access lower-level security data but not vice versa. If lower-level security users can use 
any means to access higher-level security data, directly or indirectly (e.g., by guessing), 
then the security system is termed broken. Such a means to allow a lower-level security 
user to access higher-level security data is referred to as a covert channel [I]. The basic 
motivation of multilevel database systems is to share data from different clearance levels 
but prevent any covert channels between levels. Many multilevel security database 
models have been proposed. Different models have advantages for different applications. 
For example, the Bcli-LaPadula model [75] addresses two basic needs of multilevel 
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security systems: ( I) a lower-level user cannot read any higher level data; and (2) a 
higher-level user cannot update any lower-level data. The seaView security model 
provides an applied multilevel security database system by extending the standard 
relational model (74). Several extensions of the seaView model have been proposed, for 
example the multilevel relational data (MLR) model [76] and the belief-consistent 
multilevel secure relational data (BCMLS) model [77] . However, the Beli-LaPadula 
model is the first one which clearly defines a situation where a multilevel security 
database may need to secure its data. 
6. 1 The Research Field Overview 
The Beli-LaPadula model is expressed in tenus of objects and subjects. An object 
is used to express a passive entity such as a record or a field within a record. A subject is 
used to express an active process that can request access to objects. A subject refers to a 
user in this thesis. Every object is assigned a classification and every user has a clearance. 
Classifications and clearances are expressed as labels, which signify the sensitivity of 
information. Labels are in hierarchical order of sensitivity, which means that higher 
hierarchical level labels are more sensitive than lower level ones. For example, a business 
information system might define levels Top Secret, Secret , Confidential and Unclassified 
with sensitivity labels L1, L1, L1 and L4 (here, the hierarchy is defined as L1>L1>L3>L4). 
Given two labels, L1 and Lz, the Bcli-LaPadula model proposes that the fo11owing 
two restrictions should be applied on all data accesses: 
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I) "No Read Up": A user assigned at level L1 is authorized to read an obj ect assigned at 
level~ if and only if the user's label L1 is higher than or equal to the level of the object' s 
2) "No Write Down": A user assigned at level L1 is authorized to modify an object 
assigned at level L2 if and only if the object's label l-:2 is higher than or equal to the level 
of the user's label L1• 
An easy implementation of the Betl-LaPadula model in the relational database is 
the tuple-level labeling model [78]. In the tuple-level labeling model, each record is 
considered as an object of the Bell-LaPadula model and assigned to a security level. 
Users are also assigned to different security levels. They access records according to the 
above two Betl-LaPadula's restrictions. A simple example of the tuple-level labeling 
model is illustrated in Figure 28. 
Label Age Home Phone 
21 (709)737- 1234 
L, 2 1 (709)737-1234 
25 (709)781-432 1 
Figure 28: An Example of the Tuple-level Labeling Model 
In the tuple-level labeling model, a tuple is assigned a single label, so the system 
can either allow or deny a users access to a tuple. For instance, in the above example, if 
LPL1 (the security level L1 is higher than the security level ~) and if a ~ level user 
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attempts to query the table, it can only access the second and third records. It cannot read 
or write any portion of the fi rst record. 
Compared to the tuple-level labeling model, in the element-level labeling model 
[78] each attribute of a record can be assigned a security level. Different attributes of a 
record may be assigned different security levels. Figure 29 illustrates an example table 
using the element-level labeling model. 
Figure 29: An Example of the Element-level Labeling Model 
In Figure 29, the first record's name and home phone number arc assigned to L1 
level. However, the age is assigned to ~ level. The same strategy can be applied to the 
second record, as well; the two attributes name and age are assigned to ~ level but home 
phone a/tribute is assigned to L1 level. 
In this model users are also assigned to different security levels; the accessibility 
of records is based on the accessibility of each attribute in the record to users, govemed 
by the above two Bell-LaPadula's restrictions. In contrast to the tuple-level labeling 
model, in this model a user may access a portion of a record (tuple). For example, a user 
at the L2 security level querying the table in Figure 29 will get the results in Figure 30. 
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Figure 30: A Query Result for an L2 User in the Element-level Labeling Model 
Compared to the tuple-level labeling model, the element-level labeling is more 
nexible. For example, properties in one record may be assigned to different security 
levels as shown in Figure 29. However, this nexibility also creates a problem for this 
model. Since the elements of a record can be assigned to different levels, a lower level 
user may get a lot of null values (we call it the null value problem) in this model as 
shown in Figure 30. 
Smith and Winslett proposed another multilevel security data model, the Smith-
Winslett model [80]. It combines the aspects from both the tuple-level labeling and the 
element-level labeling models. In this model, each record is assigned to a security level, 
identical to the tuple-level labeling security model; the difference with the tuple-level 
labeling model lies in the fact that in a record the elements may belong to a security level 
lower than the ruple-Jevel. A sample table based on the Smith-Winslett model is shown in 
Figure 3 1. 
TC Name Label Age Home Phone 
L, John L, 21 (709)737-1234 
L, John L, 21 (709)737-1234 
L, Alice L, 25 (709)781-4321 
Figure 3 1: An Example Data of Smith and Winslett Model 
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TC expresses the tuple· level label. Label expresses the element label. In Figure 
31, two records, the first and second, have the same values on attributes. The only 
difference is the tuple·levellabeling of the two records. The security level TC of the first 
record, L~o is higher than its element label, ~. The major difference between the Smith· 
Winslett model and the tuple·level labeling model is that the Smith· Winslett model is 
belief.based, in which a higher level tuple TC may "believe" a lower level record and 
borrow the lower level data as its record. In Figure 3 1, the first record believes the second 
record (lower level record) and borrows the data from it. The greatest advantage of the 
Smith and Winslett model is that it achieves semantic integrity at the tuple level. For 
example, in Figure 31 , if a L2 level user updates the attribute Age value of the second 
record from 21 to 22, the first record, which is a L1 level record, will automatically 
update its record value since the L1 level users believe the L2 level record. However, if 
the same update happened in the tuple level labeling model, users have to update the data 
in each level. In the model, different levels' records cannot co·operatc with each other. 
For example, in the tuple·level labeling model as shown in Figure 28, when an ~ level 
user updates the attribute Age value of the second record from 21 to 22, the first record, 
the L1 level record, wi ll not update its value since the L1 level's data are separated from 
the L2 level ' s data even though they represent the same object. 
Although the Smith·Winslet1 model is a belief·based model, it is based on the 
tuple·level. In the model, a higher·level security record either believes an entire lower· 
level record or builds its own record. It cannot believe partial lower·level record. This 
limitation reduces its flexibility. 
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The SeaView security model was proposed by Denning and Lunt in 1987 [74]. It 
was also the fi rst multilevel model used in practice. The model labels each record at the 
tuple level and also at the attribute level. The typical data format of SeaView security 
model is shown in Figure 32. 
TC Name Label1 Age Labeh Home Phone Label, 
L, John L, 2 1 L, (709)737-1 234 L, 
L, John L, 25 L, (709)737-1234 L, 
L, John L, 2 1 L, (709)737-1234 L, 
L, Alice L, 25 L, (709)781-4321 L, 
Figure 32: Typical Data of the SeaView Security Model 
The SeaView security model integrates the entity and the referentia l integrity 
rules of the re lational model with the security model. It also proposes a new concept, 
poly instantiated data. In the SeaView model, a multilevel relation may have multiple 
tuples with the same primary key with different security levels. These tuples are referred 
to as polyinstantiated tuples. Another type of polyinstantiatcd data is the polyinstantiated 
element. Polyinstantiated clements are elements identified by a primary key, the security 
level of the primary key, and an element security level, so that multiple clements for an 
attribute may have different security levels but are associated with the same (primary key, 
security level of primary key) pair. By introducing the polyinstantiation integrity rule, the 
SeaView security model is able to solve most security problems in relational databases. 
However, some problems still remain. For example, null values arc not a llowed in a 
90 
Extendfngthe instance-baseddatamodei:Semantics, performanceand securlty conslderatlons 
database based on the SeaView model. But it is common to have null values in some 
attributes of a record in the application of relational databases. So, the restriction limits its 
applications. 
The Sandhu·Jajodia model [79] is a derivation of the SeaView security model. 
The basic difference between the SeaView security model and the Sandhu·Jajodia model 
is that there are more restrictions in the insertion and update operations in the latter. In 
the Sandhu·Jajodia model, a given entity can be assigned to only one tuple on each 
security level. For example, in the Sandhu·Jajodia model, the fi rst and the second records 
of Figure 32 cannot co·exist in the database since they express the same entity (the same 
key value) on the same security level. This restriction is based on the assumption that the 
same level security users should have the same view on one object. It reduces the 
ambiguity when multiple records represent the same object at certain security level but 
have different infom1ation. The Sandhu·Jajodia model achieves the semantic integration 
in the tuple level through this restriction. Typical data in the Sandhu·Jajodia model will 
be similar to data shown in Figure 33. 
TC Name Label1 Age Labeb Home Phone Labeb 
L, John L, 2 1 L, (709)737-1234 L, 
L, John L, 2 1 L, (709)737-1234 L, 
L, Alice L, 25 L, (709)78 1-4321 L, 
Figure 33: An Example Table for the Sandhu.Jajodia Model 
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The Sandhu·Jajodia model provides security control by using tuple·level labeling 
combined with the flexibility of the element·level labeling. By playing with the 
requirements, an object must have the same view in the same security level; the model 
achieves data view integrity in each security level. 
The multilevel relational model (MLR model) [76] is substantially based on the 
Sandhu·Jajodia model and it is an improvement of the SeaView security model. It also 
combines the belief·based semantics used by the Smith-Winslett model. The model 
introduces several new concepts. For example, higher level security data can be borrowed 
from lower security levels. This approach reduces some data redundancies in databases. 
The model introduces the uplevel statement, so that lending a lower level security data to 
a higher level becomes easier. The model also introduces data-borrow integrity rules that 
ensure the consistency of data in the lower-level with the data borrowed in higher levels. 
This rule eliminates ambiguity and retains upward information flow which exists in the 
SeaView security model and its extensions. For example, according to the data-borrow 
integrity rules, in Figure 34, if the second record is deleted from the table then the age of 
the first record should set to null since no L2 level value of this attribute can be borrowed. 
However, since the SeaView security model does not allow null values, the system may 
not allow this deletion or it may allow the lower level user to delete data at its level (the 
second record) but the value remains unchanged at the higher level (the fi rst record). In 
the first case, a covert signal channel wi ll result. In the second case, ambiguous 
information will appear since there is no lower level view of data in the database. In 
addition, Sandhu-Chen proved the soundness, completeness, and security of the model. 
92 
r-----------------------------------------------------------------
Extending the instance-based data model: Semantics, performance and securicy considerations 
Name Label1 Age Labeb Home Phone Labeb 
L, John L, 21 L, (709)737- 1238 L, 
L, John L, 21 L, (709)737-1234 L, 
L, Alice L, 25 L, (709)781-4321 L, 
L, Alice L, 25 L, (709)781-4321 L, 
Figure 34: An Example Data of the M LR Model 
The Belief-Consistent Multilevel Secure Relational Data (BCMLS) model is a 
belief-based multilevel security model [77]. It extends the SeaView security model by 
allowing higher-level users to interpret the information on lower-level data (Figure 35). 
TC Name Label1 Age Labeb Home Phone Labeb 
L, John L, 21 L, (709)737-1238 L, 
L,- L, John L,L, 21 L,L, (709)737-1234 L,- L, 
L1 L2 Alice L IL2 25 L1L2 (709)781-432 1 L1L2 
Figure 35; An Example Data of the BCMLS Model 
In the BCMLS model, a tuple or an attribute may be assigned more than one 
label. In F1gure 35, the second record at tuple level (TC) has two labels and a hyphen sign 
between them. In the model, any label before hyphen means that users of this level 
believe the labeled object (a tuple or an attribute) is true. Any label after the hyphen 
means that this level of users do not trust the labeled object. For example, the tuple level 
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labels of the second record in Figure 35 means that the L:! level users believe this record 
but the L1 level users do not believe the record. 
By introducing more than one level of security label to a tuple or an attribute, the 
model provides an unambiguous interpretation to users. For example, when an L1 level 
user queries the table in Figure 35, it will obtain the results shown in Figure 36 (a), 
whereas L:z level users wi ll obtain different results as shown in Figure 36 (b). Users at 
each level will obtain exactly one record for each entity. So, the BCMLS model addresses 
the interpretation problem. 
Figure 36: Unambiguous Results to the Users in the BCMLS Model 
From the above introduction, one can see that after constructing the basic 
multilevel security model, either the tuple-level label ing model or the element-level 
labeling model, researchers have attempted to add constraints to reduce ambiguity and 
improve data sharing in databases. For example, to reduce ambiguity, the Smith-Winslett 
model introduces the belief-based constraint to achieve semantic integrity at the tuple 
level; the Sandhu-Jajodia model adds the entity rule to achieve a constant view of an 
entity in each security level; the MLR model introduces the borrow concept to achieve 
semantic integrity at either the tuple or the attribute level. Increasing labels, of course, 
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will increase the complex ity of accessing of data. On the other hand, the belief-based 
constraint increases the data sharing between higher-level and the lower-levels and 
finally the BCMLS model combines some higher-level data and lower-level data 
together. 
We have reviewed several main data models that provide multilevel database 
security. Although some other successful proposed models ex ist, most of them are related 
to the introduced models. However, although many models have been proposed, some 
problems remain unsolved. ln the following sections, we will point out some problems of 
the current models. In the next chapter, we introduce a new model, the instance-based 
multilevel security model. 
6.2 Problems with the Traditional Models 
Multi level security database systems face many challenges. A multilevel security 
database system is govemed by the two restrictions that Beli-LaPadula proposed above. 
The purpose of the two restrictions is to avoid any covert channel between security 
levels, including direct and indirect covert channels. However, when applying the two 
restrictions to a data model, in all the above models, there is a tradeoff between sharing 
data and getting more security. Some of the problems arc listed below. 
6.2.1 Data Redundancy 
The SeaView security model and its derivatives define the polyinstantiation 
integrity to achieve the goal of protecting the higher security data. However, the 
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polyinstantiation integrity rule is not a data-sharing rule. The basic principle of the 
polyinstantiation integrity rule is to split data into security levels. For example, the 
relation in Figure 37 is a polyinstantiation example in a multi level security database. 
Name is the primary key of the relation and the security classifications are assigned at the 
granularity of individual data elements. TC (namely L ,, Lz, L;, and L,> Lz>L1) is the tuple 
class of each record. 
Name Weight Age TC 
John 11 180 L, 28 L, L, 
John 11 180 L, 28 L, L, 
John 11 180 L, 28 L, L, 
Figure 37: A Customer Relation 
As we can see in the relation, the three records express the exact same real world 
thing, a customer John. However, the polyinstantiation integrity rule splits data to 
different security levels. This approach, of course, increases the data stored in database, 
resulting in a data redundancy problem. The MLR introduced the borrow concept and 
stores pointers, but not real data, in the higher-level to deal with this problem. However, 
even in that model, we still need to store three records. The BCMLS model can solve the 
problem only if the redundancy of all attributes in an entity belongs to the same security 
leveL Otherwise, the redundancy cannot be reduced. For example, data in Figure 37 can 
be stored as one record in BCMLS model as shown in Figure 38. 
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The BCMLS model can reduce redundant data in Figure 37 because all attributes 
of each record have the same security level. However, returning to the data shown in 
Figure 35, although the first two records differ in the values of only one attribute, home 
phone, the system still has to store both records with all other information as well. So, the 
BCM LS model still cannot address the problem. 
Figure 38: A Customer Relation in the BCM LS Model 
6.2.2 Null Value Inference Problem 
The second problem is inference when dealing with sensitive data in multilevel 
security models. A covert channel in a database is a means by which one can infer data 
classified at a high level from data classified at a low level. The inference problem is the 
problem of detecting and removing covert channels. An inference of sensitive data from 
nonsensitive data can only be represented within a database if the nonsensitive data itself 
is stored in the database. For example, if we have the set of data shown in Figure 39(a), a 
query from L3 level user may result in null values, as shown in Figure 39(b). The null 
values generated may result in security risks of inference. The lower level user may infer 
that there is a value for John in Weight data attribute that is not accessible. 
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Name Weight Age Name Weight Age 
James !, 180 L, 32 L, James !, 180 L, 32 L, 
John !, 225 L, 28 L, John !, Null 28 L, 
(a) (b) 
Figure 39: The Null Value Inference Problem 
Name Weight Age TC 
James !, 180 L, 32 L, L, 
John !, 225 L, 28 L, L, 
John !, 220 L, 28 L, L, 
Figure 40: Data Redundancy Problem 
And in some cases, L3 users can even breach the security system and obtain the sensitive 
infonnation by using some statistics queries [ I]. 
The null value inference problem can be reduced if tuple-level labels are added 
and each tuple-level label is set to at least the highest security level of its components. 
However, since lower-level users cannot access tuples with higher tuple-level labels, 
additional tuples have to be created for the lower-level users to access. In Figure 40, a 
tuple needs to be created for L3 level users. In general, for each lower level, we may need 
to add a tuple. However, this will result in the data redundancy problem as previously 
described. 
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6.2.3 Sensitive Key Value Problem 
In the traditional multilevel security model, the polyinstantiation integrity rule, 
intended to protect sensitive data from lower level users, allows only non-key attributes 
to have different values at different security levels. However, these models leave a 
problem unsolved: i f the sensitive data is in the key attribute(s), how should the model 
deal with it? Since the relational model uses key attribute(s) to indicate records 
(instances), when sensitive data is included in the key attribute(s), the polyinstantiation 
integrity rule can be relaxed and therefore cannot protect the sensitive data. Figure 41 
demonstrates this problem. ln the Person table, the attribute Name is a key attribute. 
Three records are assigned to different security levels. In the first record, the value James 
in Name attribute is assigned to L3 level. In the second record, the value is still James for 
the L2 level; however, in the third record, the value for Name attribute has changed to 
John and is assigned to the L1 level. This will not be a problem if the records contain data 
of two real world people. However, in this case, the three records express one real world 
thing, possibly a government agent, whose real name is John. In this case, the highest 
level's users (L1 level users) will access all three records as in Figure 41. However, 
without further infonnation they would not recognize that the first two records are only 
Person 
Weight Age TC 
160 L, 32 L, L, 
170 L, 30 L, L, 
170 L, 31 L, L, 
Figure 41: The Sensitive Key Value Problem 
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masks, which protect the last record from lower level users. 
The difficulties with multilevel security models arise from the basic concepts of 
class-based models as indicated in [2], rather than multilevel security models themselves. 
In a class-based database, a schema is the global view of the data in the database. The 
schema presents a closed world for any data in the database. Because of the existence of 
such schema, any data (and/or users) have to be assigned to a certain (global) security 
level; this is where problems arise. Since the designer has to decide security levels in 
advance to match the schema, a number of questions also arise: How many security 
levels will be sufficient for the application? Should users with the same security level but 
different needs access the same portion of the dataset? For example, does the sensitive 
information in a security department share the same security level as an academic 
department? Users also encounter very similar problems: Do all users in the sensitive 
level share identical authorization to access the data? How can administrators modify the 
authorizations of users after the system is built? If a user is initially assigned with 
medium security level, how can we allow this person to access sensitive data beyond 
his/her security level? 
Based on its theoretical principles, the multilevel security model should be a 
reliable and convenient method for protection of sensitive information. However, the 
basic concepts of class-based models have limited the applications of this security control 
methodology, hence its success. 
In the next chapter we propose a new multilevel security model, the instance-
based multilevel security model (IBMSM), based on principles of the instance-based data 
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model, ontology, and basic security theory, to solve current problems associated with 
class-based models. 
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Chapter 7 
The Instance-based Multilevel Security 
Model (IBMSM) 
In thi s chapter we propose a new security model, the instance·based multi level 
security model (IBMSM), based on the instance-based data model. The research will 
fom1all y define the IBM SM. We will also prove that the model is secure. 
In the fo llowing sections, the problems raised by mu ltilevel securi ty contro l 
models will first be addressed. Several concepts based on th e instance-based data model 
will be introduced. Finally, the instance-based multi leve l security model will be formall y 
defined. The work also includes an extension of SQL operati ons to the model. 
7.1 IBMSM 
People recognize a thing by recognizing its propert ies . However, since the 
knowledge that different people have about the real-world thing is di fferent, the level of 
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understanding, or level of recognition, of users is different as well . For example, a young 
child may only describe the sun as a bright sphere. However, an astronomer will 
characterize the sun in much more detai l, including properties such as its mass, 
temperature and photospheric composition. In the multilevel security model, the abilities 
for users to recognize an object in terms of its properties are directly related to their 
security levels. In the context of the above example, the astronomer can be considered to 
be in a higher security level than the young child. To recognize this hypothesis, we 
propose the fo llowing about an instance's views: 
Proposition 7.1 (Property Views) Users in different security levels recognize an object by 
recognizing its properties. Different levels of users have different capabilities to identify 
a property; hence there are different views of the same real property. We call these views 
of the real property. 
In Proposition 7.1, we assume that all users in the same security level have the 
same capability to identi fy a property. However, they may not have the same interests in 
the objects. For example, in a company a technical manager may be interested in objects 
related to the technical area; however, a business manager may not have interests in 
technical issues but in promoting and merchandising company products. So, we offer 
another proposition to deal with this situation. 
Proposition 7.2 (Class View) Different users may be interested in different sets of 
instances; each set of instances could be recognized as a class, which expresses all the 
common aspects of the instances. 
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Following the above propositions, the instance-based multilevel security model 
consists of three parts, the instance, the class and the control models. The definitions of 
the three parts are: 
Definilion 7.1: A view of an instance at a security level L1 is denoted by i {(P;, L1) I P; e P 
and L1e L}, where i is an instance identifier, P1 is a view of a property over the set of all 
properties (which is P), and L1 is a security level over the domain L. A pair (P1, L1) 
indicates that a property' s view, P1, belongs to the security level L1. 
An instance may have a different view in di fferent security levels. For example, 
an instance instancel{(NameJames, L3), (Weight 160, Lz), (Weight 160, L3), (Age 30, L1), 
(Age 32, Lz)}, where L1> Lz> L3 (in this chapter and the following chapter we will always 
assume that L1> L2> L3), has a view at the Lz level as following: 
instancei{(NameJames, L~, (Weight 160, LV. (Weight 160, LJ), (Age 32, LV} 
However, in the L3 level, the instance will have view as following: 
instance/ {(Name James, LJ), (Weight/60, L3)} 
As we can see, since the lower level user cannot access the higher level data, the 
instance view at the L3 level includes less infonnation than at the Lz level. 
Note that a higher level user can sec lower level data in the Definition 6.1 , which 
is the same as traditional multilevel security models (for example, the MLR model). In 
the IBMSM, an instance may not have one view of a property at high security levels but 
several views of the same property at lower levels. However, in traditional multilevel 
security models, if a higher level record needs to access values of a lower level record, it 
has to borrow a value from a certain level record before higher level records can be 
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inserted into a database (we call it the belief~based assumption in traditional multilevel 
security models). We will discuss the problem of the belief~based assumption in the next 
section. 
Definition 7.2: A class is denoted by Class_ID ( {P1}, {U1}), where Class_ID is a class 
identifier, {P1} is a subset of properties of all properties (which is P), and {U1) is a subset 
of user identifiers over all the system. 
A class contains two pieces of infonnation. First, it includes infom1ation about 
which instances should be included in the class. Second, it includes information about 
which users can access this class. For example, if we define a class Classi({Name, Age), 
{user /, user3}) then an instance lnstancel {(Name James), (Weight 170), (Age 30)} 
belongs to the class. However, an instance Jnstance2{(Name John), (Weight 170)} does 
not belong to the class. Meanwhile, user! and user3 can access this class. However, other 
users cannot access this class. 
Definition 7.3: A view of an instance at a certain security level Lb which is i {(P1, Lq) f P; 
E P, Lq~Lj, and Lq, LjE L}, belongs to a class C({Pt}, {U;}) if and only if {Pk) is a subset 
of {P1} . A user U can access a class C((PJ, {UJ) if and only if Ue{U;) . 
As we already indicated, an instance may have different views at different 
security levels. Thus, an instance may belong to different classes at different security 
levels. For example, if we define two classes, Classi ({Name, Age}, {user/, user3}) and 
Class2({Name, Weight}, {user2, user3}), then an instance, /nstancei{(Name James, L3J, 
(Weight 160, L,), (Weight 160, L,), (Age 30, L1), (Age 32, L,)}, belongs to Class! and 
Class2 at the L1 and L2 levels. However, it only belongs to Class2 at the L3 level. At the 
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L3 level, the instance only has a view lnstancei{(NameJames, L3), (Weight 160, L3)}. Of 
course, at this level it does not have the set of properties {Name, Age), which is in 
Class 1 's definition. 
To enhance system security, we propose a rule for the IBMSM model originating 
from the two Bell-LaPadula restrictions for the instance-layer. 
Rule 7.1: A user U at a certain security level L (designated as UL) can read a property 
(which is a view of the property) of an instance at a security level Lj (we express this 
property asPy) if and only if L&?Lj . However, UL can update Py if and only ifL=Lj. 
Rule 7.1 indicates that the data that users at a certain level security can read 
consists of two portions: One is the data in the same security level as that of users, and 
the other is the data in the security levels lower than that of users. The latter can be 
updated by lower-level users who have the same security level as the records. In other 
words, a user can update the data in the same security level as itself (the user); it cannot 
update data in any lower security levels even though it can read them. 
7.2 Data Interpretation in IBMSM 
For all instances i {P; IP; e P}, in the IBMSM, data are interpreted in two parts, 
the instance part and the property part. We describe each of them as follows: 
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7.2.1 Property P; and its Security Level L1 
An instance possessing a property view, P;, at a security level, Lj, is denoted as a 
pair, (P;, Lj), as in Definition 7. 1. However, since an instance may possess views of the 
same property in more than one security levels, (P;, {Lj}) is used to denote more than one 
pair, (Pio Lj), for instance (P;, L1) , (P;, L1) . (P;, L10). Conversely, if an instance 
possesses more than one property view of different real properties in the same security 
level L, they are denoted as ({P;} , L). 
7.2.2 An instances View and its Security Levels 
An instance identifier i identifies an instance in the database. i(L) denotes that an 
instance i possesses some properties at security level L. To represent that an instance 
possesses properties that belong to more than one security level (i.e. an instance i which 
possesses some properties in security levels {Lj} e L) the notation i( {Lj}) is used. 
If an instance possesses a property at a security level L, the notation (P;, L) 
represents that an L level user has created a property, P;, of the instance. 
Instances p and q are identical at a security level L if and only if they have the 
same view at the security level. That is, if for all P;, (P1, L) is a view of a property 
possessed by instance p if and only if (P;, L) also is a view of a property possessed by 
instance q. 
For example, two instances, instance I{{NameJames, L.J), (Weight /60, Lz}, (Weight /60, 
L.J), (Age 30, L1), (Age 32, LV} and instance 2{{Name James, L.J), (Name Jolm, Lz}, 
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(Weight 160, LJ), (Age 32, LJ, (Age 30, L:J), are identical at the L3 level since they have 
the same property view, {(Name James, L3), (Weight /60, L3)}, at that security level. 
Notice that the semantics of data in the IBMSM model is different from the class-
based model. In particular: 
1) In the IBMSM, the requirement that an instance should belong to any class 
(schema) is eliminated. So, the greatest lower bound to define a view of an instance at 
any security level, common in all class-based multilevel security models, is unnecessary. 
Eliminating this assumption in the IBMSM will enhance the security of the model (we 
discuss this further in the next section). For example, the null value problem does not 
exist in the IBMSM. 
2) An instance's views at different security levels may belong to different non-
hierarchical classes. In the IBMSM model, users recognize an instance by recognizing its 
properties. Users at different security levels have different abilities to recognize 
properties of an instance. Since a higher-level user can access any lower-level data, the 
higher-level users may recognize that an instance belongs to a class that the lower-level 
user may not recognize. For example, we define an ovent•eight class: a person (which is 
an instance) is overweight if his weight is more than 3001b. Then an instance {(Name 
James) L3, (Weight 280/h) L3, (Weight 305/b) L2. (Age 21) L3} belongs to the ovenveight 
class at the L2 level since its Weight is 305/b at the ~ level. However, it does not belong 
to the overweight class at the L3 level since the L3 level users only recognize its Weight as 
280/b. 
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3) The absence of a property of an instance for users at a security level means that 
this property is not present at the security level. However, the absence does not reflect the 
rejection of this property. Users in the security level may define the property later. For 
example, in the relational model any instance must belong to a table. We have to use null 
to indicate a value of an attribute of the instance if the value of the attribute is missing or 
the instance does not have this attribute. However, the mill value could be confusing (this 
is the closed-world problem). On one hand, the null value itself tells that we do not know 
whether the instance has this attribute. On the other hand, the schema indicates that any 
record in a table must have the same set of attributes. In the instance-based data model, 
this problem is solved. The instance-based data model uses the open-world model to 
indicate an instance. If users recognize a property of the instance, they just add it to the 
instance. 
4) There is no beliefbased assumption in the lBMSM. ln class-based security 
models, most recent models use a belief model to share data between higher levels and 
lower levels. For example, the MLR model utilizes the concept called borrow to allow 
sharing between high and low level records [76]. The BCMLS model has multiple labels 
to indicate whether or not higher level records can trust a lower level record [77]. 
However, whether a higher level record trusts lower level data has to be specified in 
advance of a query, not spontaneously with a query. This could cause the belief problem. 
Figure 42 illustrates this problem. Assume the three records refer to one object, a person 
James, in each relation. The actual age of James is 32. ln the beginning L3 level users 
recognize that the age of James is 32, and the ~ level users think the age of James is 30. 
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The L1 level users believe the L3 level users' view of the property, thus they inherit from 
it. Figure 42(a) illustrates these kinds of recognitions. Afterwards, the L3 level users think 
that the real age of James was 30, whereas the ~ level users realize that they were wrong 
in the beginning and update the age of James to 32, thus their initial views have switched; 
if the L1 level users still believe the L3 level view, thus continue to inherit from it, the 
proper view of the property age to the L1 level user is lost. Figure 42 (b) shows the final 
views of the di fferent security levels. 
Weight Age TC 
160 L, 32 L, L, 
170 L, 30 L, L, 
170 L, 32 L, L, 
(a) 
Name Weight Age TC 
James L 160 L, 30 L, L, 
James L 170 L, 32 L, L, 
James L 170 L, 30 L, L, 
(b) 
Figure 42: The Belief Problem 
5) In class-based security models, an object could have several views in different 
security levels. For example, most class-based security models combine several key 
attributes of a table and a security level as the real key to identify records in the table. 
Since the key attributes identify objects in the relational model, it is possible that several 
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records (as many as there are security levels) could refer to one object. However, in 
LBMSM, any object is described by its instance identifier. An object only has one 
identifier however many security levels it might belong to. This is the biggest advantage 
of the IBMSM model compared to class-based security models. The model solves several 
problems caused by class-based models. We will discuss this issue in more detail in the 
next chapter. 
7.3 Data Access and Integrity Rules 
A database is a collection of related data. A database state is a collection of all 
instances of a database at a particular time. A secure database is a database in which the 
state of the database can only change from one secure state to another secure state. In this 
section we define data access and integrity rules to guarantee that data in an IBMSM 
database is secure and consistent. 
Rule 7.2 (Instance View Integrity) An L level view of an instance i, which is i(L), can 
exist in an instance-based multilevel security database if and only if no identical view of 
another instancej,j(L), exists in the same level in the database. 
Rule 7.2 guarantees that no dupl icate objects ex ist in any level of a database. 
guarantees the semantics of the instance identifier. Since an instance identifier includes 
all the features of the instance, and no instance should have completely the same features 
as any other instances in the real world, if a user discovers that any objects have 
completely dupl icated properties, the objects arc identical. The original idea of Rule 7.2 
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comes from the semantics of the instance identifier in the instance-based data model; 
however, in the security model, we extend the rule to each security level. 
Rule 7.3 (Property Integrity} Instance i{(Pp, Lj)l Pp e P and Lj E L}e i satisfies property 
integrity if and only if for any pair of (Pp, L) e i, (P11, L) e i, and Pp -:f:. P11 the expression 
Pp r'l P11 = ¢is always true. 
Rule 7.3 states that a user at security level L can create a property Pp, which is (Pp, 
L}, of an instance i, if and only if the instance does not have property P P at the security 
level L and there is no other property of the instance i at the level L that is a compatible 
property of Pp. Rule 7.3 is also a rule extended from the instance-based data model (Rule 
4.2 defined for the instance-based data model in Chapter 4) to the IBMSM. 
Note that the property integrity rule only appl ies to properties in the same security 
level. If two properties of an instance belong to d ifferent security levels, then it does not 
matter whether they have an intersection. 
Rule 7.4: A user at security level L can read a property P; of an instance at security level 
Lj, which is the pair (P;, Lj). if and only if L:2: Lj. 
Rule 7.5: A user at the security level L can only create (or update) a property P; of an 
instance at the security level L (not higher, not lower). 
Rule 7.4 and Rule 7.5 extend the basic Bell-LaPadula rules, which are No Re(ld 
Up and No Write Down, to the instance-based setting. 
112 
Extending the Instance-based data model: Semantics, performance and security considerations 
Rule 7.6: A user at security level L can read the instance identifier of an instance i({Lj }) 
if and only if L>-L', where L' is the lowest level of {Lj }· 
Note that an instance identifier is a symbol that humans use to indicate an 
instance. By Bunge's ontology, properties can only be possessed by things. The existence 
of properties depends on things. If a user can recognize a property of an instance, it 
should know which instance this property belongs to. 
Rule 7.7: (Association Integrity) An association of two instances, i{(P;, Lj)l P; e P and 
Lje L }and i'{(P1·, Lr )l P;· e P and Lre L }, at a certain security level L!i exists only if 
(a) i and i' exist in the database. That is ie i and i 'e i. 
(b) The security level of the association, Ly, should belong to both {Lj}e i and 
{Lj ) Ei ' . That is, Lije {Lj} n {Lj )-
Rule 7.7 (a) follows the referential integrity of the instance-based data model 
introduced in the previous chapter, but (b) is new to the security model. Rule 7.7 (b) 
indicates that instances can be associated in a security level if and only if they both can 
be updated in that level. For example, assume there are 1\vo instances, instance I {(Name 
John. L,), (Age 21, L J , (Weight I 20. L,), (Sex M. L,)J and inSiance 2 {(Name Alice, L,), 
(Age 20, ~. (Sex F, ~}. in an IBMSM database. If the two instances associate together 
to fonn a higher level thing (e.g. they are married), such an association can only be 
formed at the ~ level. Although instance I belongs to the L1 level and users at the L1 
level can read instance 2, instance 2 docs not belong to the L1 level. Following Rule 7.4, 
users at the L1 level cannot update any information about instance 2. Adding an 
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association between instance I and instance 2 at the L1 level means to update information 
of both instances at the L1 level, so the operation is not allowed. 
Rule 7.8: A user u, can access data through a class, C( {P1}, {Uj}), if and only if u e {Uj}. 
Rule 7.8 represents the basic idea of the two-layered access control in the IBMSM 
that plays an important role in the security control. We discuss it in more detail in the 
next section. 
In this chapter, we introduced eight data access and update rules for the IBMSM. 
Some rules are inherited from previous multi level security models. For example, Rule 7.4 
and Rule 7.5 come from the Bell-LaPadula model. However, some of the rules are unique 
to the IBM SM. For example, Rule 7.8 is used for the two-layered security control. In 
combination, these rules guarantee the consistency and security of the model (a proof of 
this claim is provided in Section 7.6). We will show how the rules can be applied in 
different operations in the next sections. 
The rules proposed in this section are extended directly from the instance-based 
data model. The origina! IBDM did not have these rules [2]. Instead, earlier work focused 
on how to present the query ability and the flexibility of the model rather than on whether 
rules are needed to ensure that data remain consistent. Even when a prototype system was 
implemented based on the IBDM [70], the rules were not all included. After proposing 
the instance view integrity rule and the property integrity rule for the IBMSM (the first 
two rules of IBMSM), we found that the instance-based data model itself needed these 
rules to make the model consistent, even though the rules in the instance-based data 
model may not be as strict as in the IHMSM. So, we added a section in Chapter 4 
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(Section 4.6) to discuss integration rules in the instance-based data model. We have 
proposed rules in Section 4.6 and in this section in conjunction. Finally, we have rules for 
the instance-based data model to improve the consistency and reduce possible 
redundancy of data in the model. We also have rules for the lBMSM to guarantee the 
consistency and security of the model. Since the IBMSM is based on the instance-based 
data model, when we describe the rules in lBMSM, we indicate that some rules are 
extended directly from the instance-based data model. But most rules in lBMSM were 
developed in order to ensure a secure model and were not part of the original IBDM 
specification. 
7.4 Two-Layered Access Control 
The instance-based multilevel security model uses two layers to control access to 
data: the instance layer and the class layer. In the model, access is first controlled by the 
class layer. The class layer governs the range of objects accessible to a particular user. 
The second access is controlled by the instance layer, which controls the accessibility of 
the sensitive data in a class to a user. 
Figure 43 in the next page illustrates such control in the two-layered approach. 
The dataset constitutes the instance layer; the classes represent the class layer. The 
original dataset is divided into different sections, and each section contains both sensitive 
and non-sensitive data. To access the data in each section, either non-sensitive or 
sensitive, users have to be able to access different classes first. As shown in the Figure, 
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User i(L2) User3(L3) [:><_ User2(L,) I 
Class I Class2 Class 3 
Figure 43: Two· layered Controls (Darker color indicates L2 level data, grey color 
indicates L3 level data) 
in order to access the dark section (sensitive data), users have to be authorized to access 
classes first. Both User I and User 3 may access data in the dark data section since they 
both have ability to access Class I; however, User 2 cannot do so since it docs not have 
authorization to access this class. Users' abilities to access the same class docs not 
necessarily mean that they share the same abi lity to access the data in the data·section 
through this class. For instance, a L3 level user, User 3, can only access the L3 level data 
but not the ~ portion, even if it is authorized to access the same classes as the ~ level 
user, User I. 
The SeaView and its derivatives use views to control access, as well. However, 
the two. Jayered security approach in the instance·based multilevel security model is 
different from the original multilevel security models in class·based models. For 
example, in the MLR model, even if a real object has several records in different security 
levels, they belong to the same class. However, in the IBMSM, an instance may belong to 
different classes on different security levels. For example, an instance I{(NameJoJm, LJ), 
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(Student/D 200000/, L,), (Birthday 93/05/06, Lo)} is a student (defined by 
student{StudentiD}) on ~ level, but it docs not belong to the class student on L3 level. 
This approach increases the security of the IBMSM (we will discuss this in greater detail 
in the next chapter). 
7.5 Operations 
7.5.1 Insertion 
Insert an instance 
The syntax to insert an instance, issued by a L level user, is the same as the 
instance-based data model as follows: 
Insert Instance ins_!D (pJ[, p1, ... , p,J) ( I ) 
In ( l ), Insert and Instance are key words which indicate the insert instance 
operation. The ins_ID is an instance identifier. p~, p2, ... , Pn are properties. []is used to 
indicate optional elements and ' ... ' indicates repetition. 
Each Insert Instance command can insert at most one instance into a database. The 
inserted instance is constructed as follows: 
(a) If ins_ ID is not in the database, the insertion will insert the instance, ins_ID{(P~. 
L) j P1 E{ p 1[, p1, ... , pJ} and LEL }, into the database. 
(b) If ins_!D is in the database, the insertion will add the property pairs, {(P,., L) l P,. 
E{ pi{, p1 . ... , p,J} and LEL }, into the instance ins _I D. 
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There are two constraints to restrict the insertion of an instance. The instance, i, can 
be inserted into the database if and only if after insertion 
(a) No properties Pi and Pj exist such that (Pi, L) e i and (Pj, L) e i, and Pin Pj '# 
(b) No instance} exists for which ( {P1}, L) e i(L) equals ({Pj), L) e j(L) for any 
Le L 
For example, if there are some instances in a database including an instance, 
instance/ {(Height 200, LJ), (Weight 180, LJ), (Color red, LJ}, then a user at L3 level 
can insert an instance, instance2 {(Height 200, L3), (Weight 180, L3), (Color red, L3)}, 
into the database. However, the user cannot insert an instance, instance] {(Height 200, 
L3), (Weight 180, L3)}, into the database, since instance \ and instance) have the same 
property set in the security level L3. 
The first constraint indicates that the inserted instance must satisfy the property 
view integrity rule, while the second ensures that the resulting database satisfies the 
instance view integrity rule. 
Insert a mutual property 
The syntax of the insertion of a mutual property issued by L level user, UL, is the 
same as the instance-based data model, as follows: 
Insert Mutua/property mp_JD shared by ins/DI, ins/D2{, .. .] (2) 
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In (2), Insert and Mutualproperty are key words used to indicate the insertion of a 
mutua l property. The mp_ID is a mutual property identifier. The sequence ins!DI, 
ins!D2[, .. . ] are instance identifiers. 
Similar to the Insert Instance operation, each Insert Mutua! property command inserts 
at most one mutual property into a database. The inserted mutual property is constructed 
as follows: 
(a) If the sequence insiDI, insiD2[, .. .). which indicates the concept of combined 
instance, is not in the database, the insertion wi ll insert the concept of combined 
instance identifier, which is the sequence insiDI, insiD2{, .. .}, followed by the 
pairs ((mp_ID, L) l mp_IDeMPand LeL) .. 
(b) If the combined instance is in the database, the insertion will add the pairs, 
((mp_ID, L)l mp_!DeMP and Le L), into property set of the combined instance. 
From the above method, construction of a mutual property is like construction of an 
instance. However, more constraints are applied to it: 
(a) The combined instance can be inserted into the database if and only if for any 
ie(insiDI, insiD2[, .. .}}. i(L)e i 
(b) After the insert ion, for any two property pairs (MP;, L) and (MPJ'o L) of the 
combined instance, M P; n M Pj = q, 
The above two insertion operations are in the instance leve l. They operate on the 
basic data of the database. An insertion operation on the class level is also proposed, 
designated by the command insert class and is intended for system administrators. 
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Insert a class 
The syntax of the insert class issued by a system administrator in the instance-
based security model as follows: 
Insert Class C/ass_/0 ({P1[, P2, .. , P,J }. {U1[. U2, .. ]}) (3) 
In (3), Insert and Class are key words used to indicate the insertion of a class. 
Class_ID is a class identifier. P1, P1, ... , P, are properties, and U, VJ, ... are user 
identifiers. 
Each Insert Class command will insert one class into a database. The inserted class is 
constructed as follows: 
(a) If Class_ID is not in the database, the operation will insert the class, 
C/ass_ID{({PJ, {0})1 P1 e{ P,[,P,. ... , P,J} and 0 e{ U,[.U,, .. ]}. 
(b) If Class_ID is in the database, the operation will update the class with the new 
definition: Class_ID{({PJ, {0})1 P1 E{ P1[.P,. ... , P,J} and 0 e{ U,[.U,, .. ]}. 
Several restrictions have been placed to restrict the operation of Insert Class; a class c 
can be inserted into the database if and only if: 
(a) For any property, P;, if P; is in the definition of class c then P;e P. 
(b) For any two properties P1 and P1, P; e c and P1 e c, there is no precedence 
between P1 and P1 such that P; __.P1 or Pr -+P;. (Here the arrow-+- indicates 
preceding relation between properties [57].) 
(c) For any Ue {Ui }, Ue U. 
Restriction (a) indicates that any property in the inserted class must be in the 
instance layer. By Bunge's ontology, a class is a set of instances that share some 
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properties. If no instance possesses a property, then, of course, no class will exist. 
Restriction (b) indicates that any inserted class should have as few properties as possible 
in its definition. One property preceding another means they are possessed by the same 
set of instances. Restriction (b) eliminates this possibility which reduces the number of 
properties in the class definition. The restriction (c) indicates that only ex isting users can 
access a class. 
7.5.2 Deletion 
Delete an instance 
The syntax of the deletion of an instance issued by an S level user is very similar 
to the operation of insertion. The basics of the operation on the instance-based data model 
are as follows: 
Delete Instance 
Frome 
[ Where Pp {%}} (4) 
Similar to the insertion operation, Delete and Instance in (4) are key words to 
indicate deletion of an instance. The % sign indicates any lower (lower than L) security 
levels of the property, Pp, that need to be considered as a condition of the command. The 
From and Where clauses are conditions added for the deletion, which have the same 
semantics as their definitions in the relational model. 
The semantics of command (4) is implemented as follows: 
For any instance i, a user at security level I issuing a Delete Instance command 
will result in the following: 
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(a) if the instance, i, does not have any property view at / level or the instance 
does not exist in the database, then no instance or instance view will be 
deleted. 
(b) If i is only in the security level /, that is the operation will delete all properties 
of i and the instance identifier, i, itself. 
(c) If i belongs to more than one security levels, that is, then the Delete Instance 
command issued by / level user only deletes the properties of the instance, i, in I 
level. Other security levels' properties and the instance identifier of the instance 
are preserved. 
An /-level user issuing a Delete Instance operation must meet two requirements 
before the command can be executed. For the deletion of the instance i, selected by 
clause From and Where conditions: 
(a) The user must be able to access the class c. 
(b) The L level instance does not participate in a mutual property. 
Delete a mutual property 
The syntax of the deletion of a mutual property issued by an I level user is defined as 
follows: 
Delete Mutua/property mp_ID [shared by instance ins!D1, ins!D1, .. .} (5) 
In (5), Delete and Mutua/property arc key words used to indicate the deletion. mp _!D 
is a mutual property identifier. The sequence ins/DI, ins!D2, ... are instance identifiers. 
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The semantics of the command (5) are simi lar to the Delete Instance command. The 
implementation of (5) is as follows: 
for the mutual property, mp _ID, 
(a) If mp_ID is only in the security level /, then the operation will delete the 
association (mp_ID) between the sequence insiD1, insiD1, .. from the database. 
(b) If mp_ID belongs to more than one security level, then the operation issued by 
I level user only deletes the I level association bet\veen each instance of the 
sequence. The associations on other security levels will still be preserved. 
The requirements of an L level user to issue a Delete Mutua/property command 
follow the rules of the security control: 
(\)The mutual property, mp_ID, must possess a security level view equal to the 
security level L. 
(2) The user must have the ability to access each instance member in the sequence 
ins1D1, ins1D1 • ... through some classes. 
Delete a class 
In the instance-based security model, instances are stored separately from classes. 
Classes serve as security control functions most of the time. So, class deletion, with 
syntax as delete class className, issued only by system administrators in the model, is 
very easy to implement The system simply deletes the class and no condition needs to be 
met for the operation. 
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7.5.3 Select 
The syntax of the select operation issued by an /level user, u, is as follows: 
Select Pt[/%1. P, .. 1 
From c1 [, c1, •• .} 
[Where P" f%1 1 
[Sharing mp [%}] (6) 
In (6) ? 1, P1••• and P11 are properties, c1[ . c1, .. .} are classes, mp is a mutual 
property, and the % sign indicates to include all security levels lower than user u's 
security level I. 
The semantics of the Select statement is that only the instances accessible from 
the class c 1 to the user u and possessing properties P1[, P1 ... J in I level (or lower if there 
is a %sign) will be present in the results. If there are more than one class in the From 
clause, whenever the user u accesses instances from these classes, the query results will 
be presented. The Where and the Sharing clauses place restrictions only on the final 
results, which is identical to the lBDM model. 
There may be a %sign followed by a property in both Select and Where clauses in 
the IBMSM model when a query is issued as shown in (6). The sign indicates the biggest 
difference between class-based security models and the lBMSM model. As we have 
discussed, most of the multilevel security models are belief-based models. For example, 
the MLR model uses borrow to allow a higher level record to share some information 
from a lower level record. However, their belief model is based on pre-belief, which 
means that whether a higher level record believes some information of lower level 
records is decided before the higher level record is added to a database. We already 
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discussed the problems of pre~belief in section 6.2. The IBMSM does not use the pre-
belief model. It uses a post~belief model, which means that whether a higher level user 
believes a lower level information is determined at the time he/she issues a query. In the 
model, we use the % sign to indicate which level of information the higher level user 
wants to query or use the % sign to add some conditions which are in lower levels (in the 
Where clause or Sharing clause). For example, an / level user may issue a query: 
Select Name L3 From student (7) 
This query will give the / level user all the student names at the L3 level. 
The Select statement is very Oexible in the instance~based security model. Users can 
query almost anything and the statement will always return results (even if the result is 
empty). 
A user may declare a query as: 
Select P 1 From c (8) 
The user may issue query (8) even if P1 is not in the definition of class c. However, in 
general, we assume that P1 is, at least, a property preceded [57] by properties of c to 
make more sense of the queries. This restriction is useful in the security model. For 
example, if a class student is defined as enrolling a university, then a user may issue a 
query: 
Select Name, Student/D From student (9) 
Query (9) will be fine in the LBMSM model since any student should have a name and 
student number. So, the properties Name and StudentiD precede enrolling a university. 
However, if a user issues a query: 
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Select Name, Salary From student ( 10) 
Query (I 0) makes no sense if students do not have a salary (as students). 
The restrictions on Query (8) are also important in the lBMSM. As we already 
discussed, the IBMSM is based on the IBDM. In the IBDM, an instance may belong to 
more than one class. For example, an instance lnstancel{Name James, Age 30, Weight 
380, Salary 4800} might belong to two classes: Oven veight{Name, Weight> 300} and 
Employee{Name, Sa/my}. However, in the IBMSM, the ability for a user to access an 
instance is controlled by two-layers: the class layer and the instance layer. Assume a user 
is a doctor and can access patient information through the Overweight class. However, he 
cannot access any employee information. If we do not have the restriction, he may issue a 
query: 
Select Name, Salary From Overweight ( II ) 
to get some infonnation about his patient's employment, which we suppose he should not 
have the need or capability to access. 
After we introduce the restrictions above, Query ( 11 ) is not allowed since Salary 
is not preceded by Overweight class. 
7.6 Security 
Since the IBMSM is based on the instance-based theory, it is fundamentally 
different from the traditional class-based models. ln this section, we will prove that the 
IBMSM is a secure model, which means there is no covert channel between any security 
levels. 
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As we have discussed, IBMSM utilizes a two-layer approach to control access, 
the class and the instance layers. In the class layer, the accessibility of a class to a user is 
not detennined by a user's security level. Users at different security levels may access the 
same class (the definition of the class). Also, sensitive information is not accessible by 
users in the class layer. Any data in the class layer is maintained by system 
administrators. A user may query a class definition if he/she can access the class. 
Therefore, the fom1ation of covert channels is essentially impossible at the class layer. 
The following proof will focus on the instance level. 
The following notations will be used: 
U: the set of all users with varying security levels. 
/ : the set of all instances with varying views in all security levels. 
P: a property with varying security level views in an instance. 
For a certain security level/, 
UL(f): the set of users with security levels lower than or equal to /. 
UH(f): the set of users with security levels higher than /. 
IL(f): a set of views of instances with the security level / or lower. 
Iff([): a set of views of instances with the security level higher than /. 
PL(f): a set of views of properties of instances with the security level equal to or lower 
than /. 
PH( f): a set of views of properties of instances with the security level higher than /. 
From the above notations, six equations can be obtained: 
UL(/) u UH(I)~U ( I ) 
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UL(/) n UH(I)~ $ (2) 
Equations I and 2 mean that all users are in a security level either higher than I 
level or lower (or equal to) than I leve l, and no user is in a security level both higher than 
/level and lower (or equal to) than I level at the same time. 
I L(/) u iH(/)~1 
IL(/) n I H (i)~ $ 
(3) 
(4) 
The equations 3 and 4 mean that: all views of instances have their security leve l 
either higher than I level or lower (or equal to) than I level, and no view of any instance 
has its security level both higher than I level and lower (or equal to) than I level. 
PL(/) u PH(/) ~ P (5) 
PL(/) n PH(/) ~ $ (6) 
The equations 5 and 6 mean that all views of properties are in a security level 
either hi gher than /l evel or lower (or equa l to) than /level, and no view of any property is 
in a security level both higher than I level and lower (or equal to) than / level. 
Note that in rBMSM, if an instance i is in I security level, i(l) , this means that it 
has at least one view of at least one property of the instance i at the security level/. 
A database is collection of values of data. A database state is the coll ection of data 
in database at a particular time. A secure state of a database is a state in which data can 
on ly be accessed by following Beii-LaPadula 's rules (No Read Up and No Write Down). 
A secure database is a database in wh ich the state of the database can only change from 
one secure state to another secure state. 
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One Database State IBMSM Operations 
Select 
Insert 
Delete 
Another Database State 
Figure 44: IBMSM Database State Transformation 
A secure data model is a database model that takes a database from one secure 
state, through a number of operations, to another secure state. Figure 44 ill ustrates this 
idea. Goguen and Meseguer suggest a noninterfering security data model [81]. In this 
model, they define several concepts for security data models. We wi ll also use their 
definition for a secure database. For any security level/, a command to delete any data 
issued by users at a higher security level does not affect the view of data to any user at 
the lower security levels. 
Theorem 7.1: The IBMSM is a secure data model. 
As shown in Figure 44, a database is modified from the in itial to the fina l state by 
a series of user operat ions. To prove that lBMSM can only go from one secure state to 
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another secure state through a sequence of operations, we only need to prove that 
IBMSM operations are secure, since those are the only operations allowed. 
In IBMSM, all database operations are issued by users on a certain security level. 
First, we will prove any security level database operation will not affect (here affect 
means increase or reduce infonnation) at another security level. For example, a higher 
security level user operating on data should not affect any lower security level users. 
Also, a lower security level user operating on data should not affect any higher security 
level users. Thus, a direct path from neither left to right nor right to left is possible, in 
Figure 45. 
Figure 45: Different Security Levels of Users Affect Each Other 
Figure 46: Users Affect Each Other on Different Level Data 
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In fact, a user at a certain security level, /, may operate on two types of data. One 
is the data at security levels equal to or lower than /. The other is the data at the security 
levels higher than /. So, whether users affect each others in Figure 45 can be expressed as 
Figure 46. 
We will prove Theorem 7.1 by following two steps: 
To prove that any higher level data change will not affect any lower level user in 
IBMSM, we must fi rst prove Lemma 7. 1. 
Lemma 7.1: For any security Ievell, changing data at higher level security views 
of instances, JH(I), will not affect any users ueUL(l). 
Proof A user u at security level 1' can use several operations to access database, namely 
Select, Insert, and Delete. The user, u, at security level/',/' :S /,means ue UL(/). 
For the select operation, the user u can access any view of an instance, i(/')e IL(/'), whose 
security level is equal or less than the security Ievei i'. IL(I') is a set of views of instances 
that are in 1' level. Only p(l') or lower security level properties of instances, or PL(l'}, can 
be accessed by the user 11. Views of instances at levels higher than I' level are not 
accessible by user u. Since I'S 1, so PH(/');;;;;;! PH(/) and IH(I') ~ IH(/). We already know 
that ¢= IL(/') n IH(/') and ¢ = PL(/') n PH(/'). So, ¢ = IL(/') n IH(/) and$ = PL(/') n 
PH(/). That is, any changes in PH(/) and IH(/) will not affect PL(/') and IL(l'). Therefore, 
changes of PH(/) and IH(/) do not affect I' level users ue UL(/) with 1'$. 1. 
For Insert and Delete operations, any operation can be either a success or a 
fai lure. However, since IBMSM only allows 11 to operate on the data with these 
operations at its own security level, successful operations only modify the data at the 
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security level I '. Changes at other security levels of data other than / ' will not affect the 
users at those levels at all. That is, changing PH(/) and IH(/) will not affect any / ' level 
users ue UL(/) with /'~ I. 
Several factors can result in failures of operations: 
( I) An Insert Instance command issued by a I' level user, u, to insert an instance i, 
could fail if and only if 
(a) There are two properties P; and Pj, which (Pi, l')e i and (Pj, /')e i, and Pi 
n Ppt¢ 
(b) There is an instance, instance}, which i(/')=j (/') for any /'e L 
(2) An Insert Mutua/property command issued by a I' level user, u, to insert a mutual 
property of two instances, i and}, could fail if and only if 
(a) i(/') E i or J(I')E i 
(b) There are two property pairs (MP;, /') and (MPj, /') of the combined 
instance, MP; n MPj :/; cj) 
(3) A Delete Instance command issued by a I ' level user, u, to delete an instance view 
at the I' level, i(/'), could fail if and only if a combined instance (mutual property) 
is formed by the instance at the I' level. 
(4) A Delete Muw afproperty command issued by a I' level user, u, to delete a mutual 
property view at the / ' level, mp(f' ), could fai l if and only if a combined instance 
(mutual property) is formed by the mutual property at the I' level. 
All above situations arc dealing with the/' level data (instance view, property view, 
etc). However, any data at the/' level, either p(/'), mp(/'), or i(/'), belongs to PL(/') or 
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IL(/'). Since /'5 /, PH(/');;~ PH(/) and IH(/') ;;~ IH(/). So, p(/'), mp(/') < PH(/') ;;~ PH(/), 
and i(/') e IH(/') ~ IH(I). That is, changes in PH(/) and IH(/) do not affect any I' level 
users ue UL(/) with 1'-:i I. 
The proof of Lemma 7.1 is complete. 0 
Second, we are going to prove that any higher level user will not affect any lower 
level data in IBMSM. Using the same strategy, we obtain Lemma 7.2. 
Lemma 7.2: For any security level I, higher level security user u, ueUH(I), 
changing data does not affect any data PL(i) or IL(I). 
Proof: A user may change data in two ways: insert data to or delete data from an IBMSM 
database. 
( I) An Insert Instance command issued by the/ ' level (/'>/) user 11, ue UH(/), to 
insert an instance view i(l'), can only add a set of property views of the instance i, 
{p(/')}e PH(/), to the database. Since/'>/, the added data {p(/')}e PL(I). 
(2) An Insert Mutua/property command issued by the I' level (/'>/) user u, ue UH(/), 
to insert a mutual property view of two instances, i and j , can only add a mutual 
property view of the instances i and j, mp(l')e PH(/), to the database. Since /'>/, 
the added data mp(/')< PL(I). 
(3) A Delete Instance command issued by the I' level (/'>/) user u, ueUH(/), to delete 
an instance view at the I' level, i(/'), can only delete a set of property views of the 
instance i, {p(l')}ePH(/), from a database. Since/'>/, the deleted data {p(l'}}i! 
PL(I). 
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(4) A Delete mutua/property command issued by the /' level user, u, to delete a 
mutual property view at the I' level, mp(l'), can only delete a mutual property 
view mp(l')ePH(l) of instances formed to a database. Since /'>/, the deleted 
mutual property mp(l')e PL(I). 
From the above operations, it becomes clear that if the/' level user,/'>/, changes any 
data it does not affect any data in PL(I) or IL(I). 
The proof of Lemma 7.2 is complete. 0 
From the above two lemmas, neither path from higher level users to lower level data 
nor higher level data to lower level users is applicable. Figure 47 shows the results of the 
two lemmas. 
Figure 47: Affecting on Different Levels 
Finally, Theorem 7. 1 can be proven. 
Proof: As shown in Figure 47, since U = UL(I) u UH(l) and ¢ = UL(I) n UH(I). no user 
is in between UL(/) and UH(/). Because I = /L(I) u/H(I). ¢ = /L(I) n IH(I). P = PL(I) u 
PH(/), and¢ = PL(I) f1 PH(/). the intersection between two sets of data, (PH(/) & IH(I)} 
134 
Extending the Instance-based data model: Semantics, performance and security considerations 
and {PL(I) & /L(I)}, is empty, as well . Thus, no connection can be made between either 
different security levels of users or different security levels of data, which in tum proves 
that the IBMSM is a secure model. 
The proof of Theorem 7.1 is complete. 0 
7.7 Structure and Implementation Methods ofiBMSM 
We have proposed the instance-based multilevel security model and proven that 
the model is a secure model. In this section, we will discuss a possible way to implement 
the model. 
In chapter 5, we have shown that the instance-based database management system 
consists of three parts. However, the IBMSM system needs additional components as 
shown in Figure 48. These four categories are (from the bottom to the top of Figure 48): 
data storage, algorithm management, security management, SiQL language, and database 
management. The components of each category are as the following: 
Stored Data: This component includes two parts. The first is the instance layer 
data, which includes instances, intrinsic properties and mutual properties, and security 
infonnation for each intrinsic and mutual property, as well as the values of intrinsic and 
mutual properties for all instances. The data structure may vary according to the features 
of the instance-based data model. For example, in the instance layer the stored data of an 
IBMSM database may have a structure as shown in Figure 49, according to the second 
data structure in the instance-based data model. In this data structure, we maintain each 
intrinsic property as a list, consisting of the property identifier, fo llowed by a set of three 
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Figure 48: Architecture of the Instance-based Multilevel Security System 
values: an instance identifier, the value of the property for this instance, and the security 
level. In the same way, a mutual property is maintained as a list of mutual property 
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identifier fo llowed by a set of four values1: first two are instance identifiers which jointly 
possess the mutual property, the third one is the value of the mutual property, and the last 
one is the security level of the mutual property. The second part is the class layer data. It 
includes class definitions (in tenn of properties), followed by a set of users who can 
access the class (Figure 49). 
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The Instance Layer 
Class I 
Pro crt I 
Pro crt 2 
Mutual Pro rt I 
Set of Users 
The Class Layer 
Figure 49: An Example Data Structure of IBMSM 
L, 
L, 
Data Storage Methods: This area also includes two types of methods. The first 
methods are the methods used to store the instance layer information, (i.e., methods to 
store instances themselves, intrinsic properties, mutual properties and the security 
1 We only show a mutual property jointly possessed by two instances; if a mutual property is jointly 
possessed by more than two instances, we can combine the identifiers of all instances that jointly possess 
the mutual property to form a new identifier indicating the instances are related to each other using this 
mutual property. 
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information of properties). The second are the methods used to store the class layer 
information. This includes a method to store class definitions. 
Algorithms for Accessing Data: This component is related to the data storage 
method. Because data access methods are based on data structures, the algorithms can be 
categorized into two major types: methods to access instance layer information and to 
access the class layer. The first type includes an algorithm that specifies how to insert, 
delete, and retrieve instance information; an algorithm that specifies how to insert, delete, 
and retrieve intrinsic property infonnation; and an algorithm that specifies how to insert, 
delete, and retrieve mutual property information. The second type includes algorithms to 
access class layer infonnation. It includes inserting, deleting and retrieving the definition 
of classes. Each algorithm above must adhere to the rules we have defined for the 
instance· based data model in Chapter 4. 
Query or Update Algorithm: This component includes the methods and 
algorithms to query or update operations. The algorithms need to follow the constraints 
that we have discussed in Section 7 .5. For example, an insert of an instance operation 
should be denied if an instance has the same set of properties as the insert instance in a 
certain security level. 
Instance and Class Engine: The instance and class engines are the same as the 
instance·based data model. The instance engine manages the instance layer. It creates a 
unique identifier for each instance, intrinsic property, and mutual property in the 
database. The class engine manages the class layer. It creates a unique class identifier for 
each class. 
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Security Access Algorithm: This component implements algorithms for the 
multilevel security control, for example the No Read Up and No Write Down algorithm. 
All rules we have discussed in Section 7.3 and Section 7.4 must also be implemented in 
this component. 
Security Level Management: This component manages security levels in an 
IBMSM system, for example the number of levels in a database and/or the kinds of 
relations between two different levels will be managed by this component. 
Compiler: It is used to compile SiQL commands. 
SiQL language: This component uses the standard language of the IHMSM 
database system. It is a security extension of the iQL (instance-based Query Language) 
(70]. It supports a SQL-Iike query language as described in Section 7.5. 
7.8 Summary 
In this chapter, we proposed a new multilevel security model, IBMSM, according 
to instance-based concepts. The model uses two layers to ensure complete security 
control compared to the traditional multilevel security control methods, and we built 
several rules and operation methods for the model. After providing these rules, we proved 
that the model is a secure model. At the final section we discussed a possible way to 
implement the IBMSM system. The described method shows that the IBMSM system is 
implementable. In the next chapter, we will give some examples to illustrate that the 
IBMSM model solves several problems raised in traditional MLR models. 
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Chapter 8 
Power and Security 
In the last chapter we proposed the IBM SM. The IBMSM is more powerful and 
secure than traditional multilevel security models. In this chapter, we discuss how the 
instance-based multilevel security model addresses several unsolved problems under the 
traditional multilevel security models. 
8.1 Duplicate Records Problem 
First, when traditional models, for example the seaView model and the MLR 
model, deal with entity polyinstantiation or clement polyinstantiation (82], we have to 
store infom1ation about the same real world thing in different security levels. The number 
of security levels a system has determines how many records are needed, even if only 
one real world thing is being represented. Entity polyinstantiation implies a relation that 
140 
Extending the Instance-based data model: Semantics, performance and security considerations 
contains multiple tuples with the same key attribute values but with different security 
levels. Figure 50(a) illustrates entity polyinstantiation. ln Figure 50( a), the first and the 
second records of the relation Person have the same key attribute value, John. However, 
they belong to different security levels. In the first record the value of name belongs to 
the L1 level, but in the second record the value of name belongs to the LJ level. Figure 
50(b) illustrates clement polyinstantiation. In Figure 50(b), the first record and the second 
record of the relation Person have the same key attribute value in the same security level, 
where name is Jolm and the security level is L1. However, the record itself belongs to the 
different security levels. The first record belongs to the L1 level but the second record to 
the L1 level. 
Person 
TC Name Label, Age Label2 Home Phone Labe\3 
L, John L, 21 L, (709)737- 1236 L, 
L, John L, 21 L, (709)737-1234 L, 
L, Alice L, 25 L, (709)78 1-4321 L, 
(a) 
Person 
TC Name Label1 Age Labeh Home Phone Labeb 
L, John L, 21 L, 709-737-1236 Lz 
L, John L, 21 L, 709-737-1234 L, 
L, Alice L, 25 L, 709-781-432 1 L, 
(b) 
Figure 50: Entity Polyinstantiation and Element Polyinstantiation in MLR Model 
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As we have already seen, in the semantics of class-based models, records having 
the same key value represent the same real world thing. However, in class-based models, 
as shown in Figure 50, whether we adopt entity polyinstantiation or element 
polyinstantiation, we have to store the same real world thing to different security levels 
even if they only have one attribute that belongs to different security levels. This kind of 
approach reduces the possibility of data sharing and induces data storage duplication. In 
general, there is always a balance between sharing data and securing data in class-based 
models. For example, if we build a separate database for each security level, there wi ll 
not be any possibility of any covert channel occurring between any security levels; thus, 
the data is the most secure. However, data sharing between these databases is nearly 
impossible. Users have to maintain these databases separately. To conclude, building a 
separate database for each security level will cause at least two problems: the fi rst is that 
it will significantly increase the cost to maintain several databases compared to 
maintaining only one database with the same size. The second problem is that it will be 
difficult to maintain consistency of data between these databases. If we bui ld a database 
for each individual security level, we have to maintain the non-secured data consistently. 
In the IBMSM, any real world thing only has one identifier. An instance will 
belong to a security level if the instance possesses a property that belongs to the security 
level. In this model, the first and the second records in Figure SO(b) can be combined to 
store as one instance, lnstancel{(Name John, LJ),(Age 21, LJ), (Home Phone 709-737-
1234, LJ), (Home Phone 709-737-1236, LJ)}. In this case, no redundant data will be 
stored. So, the IBMSM is more efficient in storing multilevel data. 
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8.2 Null Values 
As we have discussed before, in traditional class-based models all records of a 
class (relation, table) have the same number of attributes. These attributes express the 
lowest boundary of the class. Any record has to be assigned to a class before it can be 
stored to a database. However, there are lots of possibilities where some values of 
attributes cannot be decided or obtained when users insert a record into a database. The 
relational model introduces a null value to deal with this kind of situation [85]. But the 
semantics of the null value is incomplete. For example, the most commonly asked 
question about a null value is whether it means "we do not know" or "it is not 
accessible". In the multilevel security model a null value may also produce a covert 
channel as we have discussed before. So, the most traditional class-based M LR models 
do not support a null value. For example, SeaView and the MLR do not allow null values 
to avoid this kind of confusion and the problems that result. However, the null value 
problem comes from the theory of class-based models. Traditional relational models are 
based on the class-based model. They simply cannot avoid null values. Null values 
widely exist in traditional relational databases. By not supporting null values, class-based 
security models cannot be applied to this kind of dataset. Of course, this limits the 
applications of models. 
The IBMSM is based on the instance-based data model, which is an open world 
model. In contrast to class-based models, which only support fixed attributes in a class, in 
the instance-based multi level security model, an instance may be independent of any 
class. In the model, before an instance is stored into a database, one does not need to 
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assume the instance belongs to certain classes. An instance belongs to a class because the 
set of properties in the class definition is a subset of the properties of the instance. An 
instance does not need to store any infonnation about a property if the property does not 
belong to it. So, in the IBMSM the null value problem does not exist. 
8.3 Sensitive Data in the Key Attributes 
When dealing with sensitive data in the key attributes, traditional multilevel 
security models generate several problems. 
8.3. 1 Multilevel Key Attributes Problem 
When the key consists of multiple attributes, traditional M LR models need to set 
all the key attributes in the same security level. In this case, the values of the key 
attributes cannot be borrowed from the lower level as indicated in MLR. Let us assume 
that we have the same relation as Figure 50( a); however, the key of the relation is defined 
as two attributes: Name and Age. Since the key attributes should be in the same security 
level, the value of the age attribute in the first record of Figure 50( a) cannot be borrowed 
from the second record (the lower level record). We have to set a separate value of this 
attribute at L2 level, which is the same security level as the name attribute level. Figure 51 
shows the resulting relation. The value of the Age attribute in the first record and the 
value of the Age attribute in the second record belong to different security levels. They 
are not related to each other even though they have the same value and represent the same 
144 
Extending the instance-based data model: Semantics, performance and security considerations 
aspect of the same thing. Of course, reducing the borrow capability in key attributes 
reduces the flexibility of databases. On the contrary, an lBMSM database does not have 
key attributes. An instance will automatically belong to a security level if it possesses a 
property that is in the security level. In the IBMSM model, the instance depicted in 
Figure 50(a) can be stored as lnstancei{(Name John, Lz), (Name John, LJ), (Age 21, L3), 
(Home Phone 709-737-1234, LJ), (Home Phone 709-737-1236, Lz) }. In this case, the L1 
level users will get all stored information of the instance, whereas the L3 level users will 
get a view of the instance as: lnstancel{(nameJohn, L3) , (Age 21, L3}, (Home Phone 709-
737-1234, L,j}. 
The IBMSM is clearly flexible to represent things that belong to multilevel security 
levels. 
Person 
TC Name Label1 ~ Labeh Home Phone Labeh 
L, John L, £)_ L, (709)737-1236 L, 
L, John L, £)_ L, (709)737-1234 L, 
L, Alice L, ~ L, (709)781-4321 L, 
F1gure 51: Multiple Key Attributes Problem in MLR 
8.3.2 Key Loophole Problem 
Another problem when traditional M LR models deal with sensitive data in the key 
attributes is the key loophole problem [83]. A key loophole occurs when key attribute 
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values are di fferent in different security levels but represent the same entity in the real 
world. To illustrate the problem, consider the following example: 
A fictional airline company, let us call it West Airline, keeps track of its 
passengers in an MLS database. The airline classifies its employees into two clearance 
categories, L; and L1, by the sensitivity of information they are allowed to see. Every 
passenger must be accounted for, on every clearance level. However, the actual 
passenger's age and occupation may be hidden from some security levels. The sample 
relation shown in Figure 52 contains information about two passengers. All the 
information on passenger Alice is available for all two clearance levels. However, the 
infonnation on passenger John, an air marshal, is more sensitive. The subjects on the L1 
level view John's age, the correct occupation and seat number. The subjects on the L; 
level can only see the seat number; both John's age and occupation are masked. 
Passenger 
Name Age Occupation Seat# TC 
Alice /,J 25 L, Student L, 123 L, L, 
Alice /,J 25 L, Stt1dcnt L, 123 L, Lz 
John /,J 28 L, Teacher L, 125 L, L, 
John /,J 30 Lz Air Marshal Lz 125 L, Lz 
Figure 52: Passenger Relation 
There will not be any problem to use MLR in this case. For example, the L; level 
and L1 level users will have their views as in Figure 53. 
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However, if we need to mask John's name on LJ level as well, then we only have 
one way to do that in the current class-based MLR models, as shown in Figure 54. 
Passenger L1 Level View 
Name Age Occupation Site# TC 
Alice 0_ 25 L, Student L, 123 L, L, 
Alice 0_ 25 L, Student L, 123 L, L, 
John 0_ 28 L, Teacher L, 125 L, L, 
John 0_ 30 L, Air Marshal L, 125 L, L, 
Passenger LJ Level View 
Name Age Occupation Site# TC 
Alice 0_ 25 L, Student L, 123 L, L, 
John 0_ 28 L, Teacher L, 125 L, L, 
Figure 53: Different Level Views on Passenger Table 
Passenger 
Name Age Occupation Seat# TC 
Alice 0_ 25 L, Student L, 123 L, L, 
Alice 0_ 25 L, Student L, 123 L, L, 
David 0_ 28 L, Teacher L, 125 L, L, 
John 0_ 30 L, Air Marshal L, 125 L, L, 
Figure 54: Mask John's Name in Passenger Relation 
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In Figure 54, if we simply change mask John under a fictional name David on the 
L3 level, it seems very simple. However, we now have a problem. In this case, the user on 
the L2 level should know that David is simply a mask for John, and the passenger named 
David is fictional. The L2 level user should treat all records related to David as non-
existing. This can cause problems in situations when an L2 level user has to communicate 
with lower level users. For example, the L2 level user would not know that LJ level users 
are aware of the passenger David in case he has a medical emergency. 
Another way for the MLR models to deal with the key loophole problem is to 
hide the higher level data from lower level users. This approach is illustrated in Figure 
55. 
In this case, the information about the passenger John is completely hidden from 
the lower level users. However, unless we physically separate the seats of a higher 
security level passengers from the lower security passengers on an aircraft, which is 
impossible and against the purpose of having air marshals on board, this will cause 
confusion and possibly leak information to the lower level users. 
Passenger 
Name Age Occupation Seat# TC 
Alice 0 25 L, Student L, 123 L, L, 
Alice 0 25 L, Student L, 123 L, L, 
John 0. 30 L, Air Marshal L, 125 L, L, 
Figure 55: Hidden Passenger John from Lower Level Users 
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For example, a stewardess (assuming a L3 level user) wi ll notice that a passenger is in the 
seat number 125. However, according to the database, this seat should be empty. This 
apparently conflicting information can cause confusion and, more importantly, the LJ 
level users to become aware of the fact that that information was kept hidden from them. 
Therefore, this approach has a potential to open covert channels [84]. 
In the instance·based multilevel security model, the instance identifier represents 
the real world thing. It is not assigned to any security level. And there is only one 
instance identifier for one real world instance. For example, to set a cover story for 
passenger John, in IBMSM model what we need to do is set a mask value for his name, 
age, and occupation. An IBMSM database stores John's information like the fo llowing 
Jnstancei{(Name John, Lz), (Name David, LJ), (Age 30, Lz), (Age 28, L3), (Occupation 
Air Marshal, Lz), (Occupation Teacher, L3), (Seat# 125, LJ)}. When a L3 level user 
queries John's infonnation, he/she will get a view as the following lnstancel{(Name 
David), (Age 28), (Occupation Teacher), (Seat# 125)}. John 's information is completely 
covered. The potential to produce covert channels in relation to traditional class·based 
MLR models is greatly limited because, in the instance·based multilevel security model, 
no key attribute needs to be dealt with. 
8.4 Summary 
In this chapter we have given several examples to demonstrate how the IBMSM 
model solves the problems which traditional MLR models cannot. The most significant 
difference between IBMSM and the class·based traditional multilevel security models is 
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how the data are stored in databases. ln the IBMSM, there is only one instance stored in 
databases, regardless of how many security levels to which the instance belongs. This 
gives IBMSM an advantage in achieving the purpose of building a multilevel security 
database that supports sharing data under different security clearances without any covert 
channel. Meanwhile, the IBMSM model also solves several problems that occur when 
traditional MLR models deal with sensitive data in the key attributes. The model also 
does not have the null value problem which widely exists in traditional MLR models. 
Therefore, the IBMSM model is very suitable for management of multilevel security 
data. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions and Future Work 
This chapter has three major sections. The first section describes the primary 
conclusions that have been arrived at through this research. The second section 
summarizes the research contributions. The third section outlines a number of directions 
for future research. 
9. 1 Conclusions 
Traditional databases are designed for special purposes. Designing a database for 
multiple applications is a difficult task using traditional database models. The instance-
based data model adopts a two-layered approach to manage data in a database. It provides 
the possibility to use one data set for multiple applications by storing data on the bottom 
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level (the instance level) and building multiple applications on the top level (the class 
level). This thesis addresses issues related to the instance-based data model in three parts: 
First, we assigned ontological semantics to the instance-based data model to 
address several semantic problems. We provided an ontological interpretation of the 
instance identifier and proposed a method to implement it. The research also provided a 
mean to express properties and their relationships in the instance-based data model, 
which reduced the complexity in the management of the instance-based database and 
improved the query efficiency of the model. Also, by assigning the semantics of Bunge's 
ontology to the instance-based data model, we developed a method to represent things in 
the real world as instances in the instance level. Related instances form a higher level 
conceptual thing; thus, in principal, when one combines all instances, the real world 
could be represented in the highest level. This method makes the instance-based data 
model closer to an ontological view of the nature of the real world, which in tum benefits 
the future development of the model. The research also defines several integrity rules of 
the instance-based data model to prevent possible inconsistencies in an instance-based 
database. 
The instance-based data model provides not only flex ibility and multiple-
application potential [2], but also comparable or better performance than the traditional 
model. In the second part of the research, we provided evidence that the instance-based 
data model can perform queries even faster than relational model in some cases. The 
theoretical analysis and the empirical evaluation showed some interesting results and 
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improved our confidence to develop the instance·based data model for future 
applications. 
In the final part of the research, as an application to the instance·based theory, we 
proposed a new security model, the instance-based multilevel security model (IBMSM). 
We fonnally defined the instance·based multilevel security model. By defining data 
interpretation, integrity rules, and two-layered control model for the instance-based 
multilevel security control, we showed that the new model solves several problems in the 
multilevel security control field. The research extended operations of the traditional SQL 
and instance-based iQL statements to the IBMSM. We also proved that the instance· 
based multilevel security model is indeed a secure data model. There are two key features 
that make the IBMSM more secure than traditional multilevel security models: first, the 
model uses the 'post-belief method so that the higher level users can share lower level 
data without pre-definitions. This method improves flexibility in data sharing and reduces 
possible data redundancy in different security levels. Second, the model uses a two· 
layered control method to restrict database access. Since higher level security users can 
recognize all the properties which have been recognized by lower level users but not vice 
versa, this method guarantees that higher level security users may access more instances 
even through the same class as lower level users. By using two·layered control, the 
IBMSM acquires more powerful security than traditional multilevel security models. 
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9.2 Contributions 
Our research provides several contributions for the instance-based database 
development. 
First, following Bunge's ontology and [2], we have mapped the concepts in the 
database area to the real world and provided several implementation approaches for such 
mapping; thus, it provides an opportunity for further instance-based application 
development without the restriction implied by the traditional class-based model. Second, 
the perfonnance of the instance-based data model was not addressed in previous research. 
It might seem natural that by providing more flexibil ity to applications the instance-based 
data model may have to trade off with lower efficiency. However, in this research, we 
proved that the instance-based data model can be even more efficient than the class-based 
model for certain query operations. For example, we proved that if the number of 
attributes in a table is more than 1.25-1 .33 times the number of the queried attributes, the 
instance-based model (by using the second data structure) is much faster than the 
relational model. By developing a more suitable data structure that incorporates query 
optimization techniques, we believe the instance-based data model may perform even 
better than class-based models. 
Third, previous work on the lBDM focused on building the model itself [2] [49] 
[57}. Our research proposes a new application model, the IBMSM model, to the security 
control area to solve several problems that exist in class-based security models. The 
success of the IBMSM demonstrates the instance-based data model is not only an abstract 
model but can be a platfonn to generate specific security models for different 
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applications. Our research provides an example to implement the instance·based data 
model to an applied field. We believe that the instance-based data model can be explored 
in many other fields in the futu re. 
9.3 Future Work 
Future research on the instance·based data model can be of two categories. The 
first is related to the model itself. Although property precedence has an excell ent 
capabi lity for managing semantics in the instance·based data model , to manage the 
precedence system efficiently is a challenge. By definition, one property precedes another 
property because any instance that possesses the latter property must possess the former, 
as well. However, in the instance-based data model, an instance may gain or lose a 
property at any time. So, the preceding relation between properties may change over 
time. This presents a unique chal lenge to database developers. Also, since the structure of 
the instance·based data model is different from the class·based model, the access method 
(structure) should not be the same, as well . [70] provides a basic structure (8+ tree) to 
implement an instance·based database system, since 8 + tree is designed to store fixed 
length of data, we believe B+ tree is not the best structure for the instance.based data 
model. The next challenge would be to suggest a better structure other than a 8 + tree for 
the instance·based data model. 
The second area of needed research is related to the application of the model. We 
already know that the instance·based data model is suitable for building multiple 
applications on one data set. For example, in this research we have built the IBMSM 
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which had several security level applications on one data set. Developing suitable models 
for application areas will be the next direction. Another challenge of the research is on 
merging the instance-based data model with the current models. As of now, data are still 
stored in different systems for different purposes. For example, sales systems are used for 
retail applications, and bank systems are used for financial organizations. To build an 
instance-based system that can efficiently utilize those data directly with the minimal cost 
would be the next research area. To build a two (or more) layered model is a possibility, 
as suggested in [2]. However, better approaches to integrate data from class based model 
to the instance-based database are still desired. 
The instance-based data model provides many potential opportunities for database 
applications. We believe that as more research is done on the topic, new application areas 
will be found and more advantages of the model would be discovered. 
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Appendix: Wisconsin Benchmark Queries and Results 
Qu ery Non-indexed property queries Rdb idb Comment 
1 Select unique! from TENKTUPl where unique! between 0 and 10099; 5.4 0.73j l% selection 
Select unique!, two from TENKTUPl where uniquel between 0 and 10099; 5.37 3.76 
Select unique!, two, four from TENKTUPl where unique! between 0 and 10099; 5.6 8.43 
Select unique! , two, four, unique3 from TENKTUPl where unique! between 0 and 10099; 5.87 12.9 
insert into tmp Select unique! from TENKTUPl where unique! between 792 and 100791; 7.78 2.71 I to% selection 
insert into tmp Select unique!, two from TENKTUP1 where uniquel between 792 and 100791; 7.73 7.8 
msert mto tmp Select un1quel, two, four from TENKTUP l where umquel between 792 and 100791; 79 12 61 
insert into tmp Select unique1 from TENKTUP1; 21.22 12.57 \ 100% selection 
insert into tmp Select unique1, two from TENKTUP1; 21.06 18.25 
10 I insert into tmp Select unique1 , two, four from TENKTUP1; -~ 24.1 
Clustered-Index property queries 
11 Select unique2 from TENKTUP1 where unique2 between 0 and 10099; 0.14 0.06 I 1% selection 
12 Select unique2 , two from TENKTUP1 where unique2 between 0 and 10099; 0.13 0.14 
13 Select unique2 , two, four from TENKTUP1 where unique2 between 0 and 10099; ~~: 0.19 14 Select unique2 from TENKTUP1 where unique2 between 792 and 100791; ··--·-·-·- -0~2 I 10% selection 
15 Select unique2, two from TENKTUP1 where unique2 between 792 and 100791; 0.62 0.66 
16 Select unique2 , two, four from TENKTUP1 where unique2 between 792 and 100791; 0.72 0.67 
17 insert into tmp Select unique2 from TENKTUP1; 21.15 11.28 I 100% selection 
18 insert into tmp Select unique2, two from TENKTUP1; 21.01 17.77 
19 insF>rt into tmp Select unique2. two. four from TENKTUPl: 21.67 22.77 
Non-Clustered-Index property queries 
20 Select unique3 from TENKTUP2 where unique3 between 0 and 10099; 0.11 I 0.06 I 1% selection 
21 Select unique3, two from TENKTUP2 where unique3 between 0 and 10099; 0.33 I 0.14 
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22 Select unique3, two, four from TENKTUPl where unique3 between 0 and 10099; 0.33 0.19 
23 Select unique3 from TENKTUP2 where unique3 between 792 and 100791; 0.2 0.2 I 10% selection 
24 Select unique3, two from TENKTUP2 where unique3 between 792 and 100791; 1.45 0 .66 
25 Select unique3, two, four from TENKTUP2 where unique3 between 792 and 100791; 1.4 0.67 
26 insert into tmp Select unique3 from TENKTUP2; 13.88 11.28 I 100% selection 
27 insert into tmp Select unique3, two from TENKTUP2; 25.44 17.77 
28 insert into tmp Select unique3. two. four from TENKTUP2: 26.72 22.77 
Al!erel!ation 
29 select min{uniquel) from tenktupl; 5.34 0.84 
30 select min(unique2) from tenktupl ; 0.05 0.05 
31 select min(unique3) from tenktupl group by one percent; 6.8 4.52 
32 select mi n(unique2) from tenktupl group by onepercent; 5.65 4 .48 
33 select sum{unique3) from tenktupl group by one percent; 5.38 5.6 
34 select sum(unique2) from tenktupl group by one percent; 5.65 4.91 
Update 
35 I update tenktupl set unique2=1000001 where unique2=19000; 0.11 0.09 Clustered -Index 
36 I update tenktup2 set unique3=1000002 where unique3=19000; 0.13 0.09 Non-Clustered-Index 
37 J update tenktupl set unique2=1000002 where unique1=19000; 6.79 1.4 Non-Index 
Join 
38 1 select tenktupl.uniquel, tenktup2.unique3 from tenktupl, tenktup2 where Join on clustered-
tenktupl.unique2=tenktup2 .unique2 and tenktupl.uniqu el <lOOOO 6.49 4.15 index property 
39 I ~=~ek~u~l~~~~~~~~~~nek~·u:;~~~~~u2n~~~e;e~~t:p~.~~t~~~!·3~e1:~2 w here 0.27 0.36 
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